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Preface
Research on economic growth and development in developing countries has often high-
lighted the role of liberalisation policies (economic and political) in improving economic
performance in the developing world. In sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, efforts at fos-
tering economic growth and development have not only resulted in the adoption of these
policies, but have also led to the proliferation of regional economic integration (include
monetary unification). Nonetheless, the impact of these policies on economic performance
continues to be a subject of debate among policy makers, development partners, academic
researchers, and the international community at large. This debate has become increas-
ingly important in light of the challenges facing the aforementioned agents in helping to
improve the economic performance of these countries. This thesis focuses on this topic
providing empirical evidence for sub-Saharan African countries.
The first chapter uses post-liberalisation data on Ghana and focuses on the extent to
which trade openness and foreign aid inflows impact on economic growth. Ghana, being
one of the forerunners to adopt liberalisation policies in sub-Saharan Africa, has received
commendations from the international community for its post-liberalisation economic
growth performance. This has increased government commitment in recent years to open
the economy to international competition. Moreover, foreign aid inflows over the period
have been relatively large. The study, which employs the Autoregressive Distributed Lag
(ARDL) bounds testing approach to cointegration, provides empirical findings, which
clearly indicate that the impact of both trade openness and foreign aid on Ghana’s post-
liberalisation economic growth is positive and statistically significant in both the short-run
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and the long run, although this is somewhat reduced by their interaction. In addition,
the study reveals long run economic growth benefits of Ghana’s political system whilst
government spending and labour force performance retarded economic growth over the
study period. The empirical findings and policy recommendations are relevant for Ghana’s
long-term economic growth policy reforms.
The second chapter, taken cognisance of the fact that sub-Saharan Africa has been
characterised by low-income levels for decades, analyses the impact of economic globali-
sation and democracy on income levels in the area using panel cointegration techniques.
The study considers a composite indicator for economic globalisation and several indica-
tors of democracy and highlights the essence of the simultaneous adoption of economic
globalisation and democracy for sub-Saharan African countries. The empirical results,
based on a sample of 31 countries over the period 1980-2005, clearly indicate that, whilst
the total long run impact of economic globalisation on income levels has been beneficial,
the total long run impact of democracy has been the bane of the level of income in sub-
Saharan Africa. The study concludes that policy reforms should be aimed at improving
democratic institutions in sub-Saharan Africa for its potential benefits to be realised
The third chapter focuses on the implications of trade openness, foreign aid and democ-
racy for the fulfilment of Wagner’s law in West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) countries.
Although the impact of trade openness, foreign aid and democracy on government expen-
diture in developing countries has been emphasised in the literature in recent decades
most recent studies of Wagner’s law have often neglected the increasing role played by
these policy variables. The study provides an empirical analysis of the long run implica-
tions of trade openness, foreign aid and democracy for the fulfilment of Wagner’s law in
WAMZ countries using panel data techniques for the period 1980-2008. The study finds
the existence of Wagner’s law in WAMZ countries, but only when the role of these pol-
icy variables has been catered for. The analysis concludes that, if these countries are to
meet the fiscal convergence criteria and ensure the sustainability of a single currency area,
explicit sets of restraint on the national authorities and innovative and efficient ways of
vii
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domestic revenue generation necessary to ensure that government revenue keep pace with
its expenditure become crucial, because the monetary union by itself may not necessarily
ensure fiscal discipline.
The fourth chapter focuses on the relationship between democracy, government spend-
ing, and economic growth. Although, economic theory predicts that various core functions
of governments are growth enhancing, its spending in non democratic countries often goes
beyond these core functions, namely into rent-seeking and non-productive activities. The
study employs the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) bounds testing approach to
cointegration to investigate the extent to which democracy and government spending have
had an impact on economic growth in Ghana over the period 1960-2008. The empirical
results obtained are encouraging, revealing support for the high efficiency of government
spending in democracies hypothesis. The study demonstrates that democracy and gov-
ernment spending go hand in hand in providing a complementary role to impact positive
on economic growth in Ghana in both the long-and short-run.
The fifth chapter investigates the impact of trade openness on economic growth and
development for a sample of 85 middle-income countries over the period 1970-2009. The
study employs non-stationary heterogeneous panel cointegration techniques that take into
consideration the impact of cross-section dependence. The analysis reveals four impor-
tant findings. Firstly, that trade openness has been one of the main drivers of the level
of development, but not of economic growth in middle-income countries. Secondly, that
trade openness is both a cause and a consequence of the level of development in middle-
income countries. Thirdly, that neglecting the impact of cross-section dependence over-
estimates the coefficient linked to the long-run relationship between trade openness and
development. Lastly, and most importantly, that these results are consistent for all the
20 middle-income sub-Saharan African countries included in the sample.
viii
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Chapter 1
Trade Openness, Foreign Aid and
Economic Growth in Post-libera-
lisation Ghana: An Application of
ARDL Bounds Test
1.1 Introduction
At year’s end statistics are compiled for all countries of the world showing their relative
rates of economic growth. Does it really matter if a country’s national output rises or falls
over time? For the many developing countries faced with poverty and growth problems the
answer may be obvious. “Aggregate growth is probably the single most important factor
affecting individual levels of income” (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004). It has important
implications for the welfare of individuals, most importantly the plight of the poor, making
it widely considered a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for poverty alleviation
(Oosterbaan and Van Der Windt, 2000). These statements reflect the recognition that
the difference between prosperity and poverty for a country depends on how fast it grows.
In view of the importance and the central role that economic growth has assumed in the
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development process of modern economies (more importantly in developing countries) it
is imperative that its nature and determinants are well understood for each country.
Ghana prior to the adoption of liberalisation policies in 1983 witnessed poor economic
growth performance. Although the highest economic growth performance (after indepen-
dence in March 1957 and before liberalisation policies in 1983) of 7.2% occurred in 1970,
economic growth performance for most periods was poor. For example, the years 1964-
1966, 1968, 1972-1973, 1975-1976, and 1979-1983, saw Ghana with negative real GDP
per capita growth with the lowest of -14.5% occurring in 1975 (see Figure 1.1). This re-
sult was mainly due to the adoption of import substitution industrialisation (ISI) policies
coupled with successive political instability, disinvestment, total factor productivity slow-
down, and the deep economic crisis that occurred in the mid-1970s. Moreover, there were
conflicts in policy objectives and a number of trade control regimes and instruments (high
tariffs, stringent quota restrictions, export restrictions, foreign-exchange restrictions, and
high black-market premium) that resulted in exchange rate and balance of payment prob-
lems1. For instance, it was expected that a policy to expand the manufacturing base
through ISI would automatically be accompanied by an increase in manufactured exports
(and therefore a diversification of export) supported by an effective export promotion
package (Aryeetey et al., 2000). Unfortunately, the export incentive package was ineffec-
tive resulting in drastic decline in export performance. The conclusion we can draw from
the poor performance of the economy during the greater part of the pre-liberalisation
period is that, the policies that were implemented were inappropriate and inadequate.
The need for alternative policies that could turn the economy of Ghana around became
evident, as in particular the ability of developing countries to receive financial assistance2
from the World Bank, IMF and other bilateral and multilateral institutions routinely be-
came conditional upon the adoption of liberalisation policies (see Edwards, 1993; World
Bank, 1998; Remmer, 2004). For these reasons, Ghana undertook a broad range of eco-
1See (Rodrik, 1999; Aryeetey and Fosu, 2005)
2They usually come in the form of foreign aid given for budgetary support, technical assistance,
development projects, emergency and humanitarian assistance and for colonial, political, governance and
diplomatic reasons (see Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Bourguignon and Leipziger, 2006)
2
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Figure 1.1: Trend in Real GDP/Real GDP per capita growth (annual %), 1961-2008
nomic reforms (Rodrik, 1999) launched on the basis of liberalised policy regime that began
with the World Bank and IMF sponsored Structural Adjustment Programme in 1983. It
initially focused on removing distortions in the foreign exchange market, trade restrictions
and then corrected for structural and macroeconomic imbalances that were believed to
have caused the economic decline. The government believes that, because the domestic
market is small in general, economic growth must necessarily come from international
trade. For this reason, the government has in recent years been committed towards trad-
ing partnerships and agreements, international trading rules, as well as participation in
negotiations in multilateral trading3. Moreover, we observe (see Figure 1.24) that foreign
aid (left y-axis) increased significantly in the 1960s, but was almost stable in the 1970s
(the 1960s and 1970s also saw Ghana with declining degree of trade openness (right y-
axis)). On the contrary, we observe increases in both trade openness and foreign aid after
3See Ghana Trade Policy (2004)
4In Figure 1.2 both openness and aid are expressed in natural logs
3
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Figure 1.2: Trend in Trade Openness and Foreign Aid (% of GDP), 1961-2008
1983. It is not surprising that post-liberalisation growth performance has been encourag-
ing with the highest real GDP growth of 8.6% in 1984, the first year after liberalisation
(see Figure 1.1). To a much greater extent the reforms combined with inflow of foreign
aid have helped Ghana recover from a prolonged period of economic decline.
However, it was expected that real GDP growth could accelerate from the 8.6% rate
achieved in 1984, but unfortunately the country has since not exceeded this rate. In
particular, in 1993, under its Vision 2020 programme, Ghana set for itself a target aimed
to move from a lower-income country to an upper middle-income country by the year 2020.
The economy was expected to grow at an average of 8% between 1995 and 2020. More
ambitiously, and in order to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015,
the Vision 2020 policy document was amended and it is now aimed at 2015 (i.e. Ghana
Vision 2015)5. In spite of these policy efforts, the average real GDP growth in the country
5Beginning in 2003, Ghana Vision 2015 policy document has been implemented under the Ghana
Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I and II)
4
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from 1990 to 2000 was only 4.3% while from 2000 to 2005 it increased only to 5.1% (African
Development Indicators, 2010). The rate in terms of real GDP per capita growth is even
lower. For this reason, government commitment to trade openness, in particular, has not
been shared by all, as the country has since 1984 made only modest progress towards
the 8% growth target. Pessimists argue that, in spite of the many efforts of government
towards trade openness, the recent growth record is still inadequate. To them, although
the recent growth achievement is commendable, it is not unique as similar growth records
were achieved under different policies in the early post-independence period6(Aryeetey et
al., 2000). The impact of the reform policies and foreign aid inflows are deemed much
lower than expected, if Ghana aims to achieve its 8% growth target. This raises a number
of questions on the extent to which trade openness and foreign aid inflows have contributed
to economic growth in Ghana, over the post-liberalisation period.
The present study employs the Autoregressive Distributed Lag bounds testing ap-
proach to cointegration (henceforth, ARDL bounds test)7 proposed by Pesaran et al.
(2001) to investigate whether there is a level long run equilibrium relationship between
trade openness, foreign aid and economic growth in Ghana over the post-liberalisation
(1984-2007) period. The main results of the study suggest that while the labour force,
gross domestic investment and government expenditure have no short-run and long run
statistically significant positive impact on economic growth, trade openness and foreign aid
have statistically significant short-run and long run positive impact on economic growth,
although this is somewhat reduced by their interaction. Moreover, the political system
predicts both short-run and long run positive impact on growth, although this effect is
not significant in the short-run.
The rest of the study is organised as follows. Section 1.2 review related literature.
Section 1.3 describes the estimation method and the data. Section 1.4 report and discuss
the empirical results. Section 1.5 concludes the study with policy recommendations.
6This is not surprising as we observe from Figure 1.2 that the trade openness degree has not yet
reached the level achieved in the 1960s
7The rational for the choice of the ARDL bounds test is discussed under estimation method and the
data
5
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1.2 Related Literature
1.2.1 Trade Openness
The idea that trade openness enhances economic growth dates back to at least the 18th
century when Adam Smith first published his famous treatise, The Wealth of Nations8.
Smith’s ideas were that international trade permits increased specialisation, economics of
scale, diffusion of knowledge, heightened domestic competition and increased utilisation of
a country’s abundant resources (Sachs and Warner, 1995). However, these ideas became
less popular during the post-war period when most developing countries adopted protec-
tionist policies aimed at protecting domestic industries from intense foreign competition.
Although during a greater part of the post-war period a large number of development
economists accepted this protectionist view, and developed models that relied heavily on
the import-substitution ideas, others argued that abundant evidence exists suggesting that
more open and outwardly oriented economies had outperformed those countries pursuing
protectionist policies (Edwards, 1993). Developing countries, that adopted protectionist
policies later realised that such inwardly oriented policies were no longer sustainable as
their economies had over the period performed poorly. In particular, while many de-
veloping countries, especially those in Latin America that followed protectionist policies
experienced slower growth rates, East Asian countries, that adopted export oriented poli-
cies, consistently outperformed these countries (Yanikkaya, 2003).
Two influential theoretical growth theories (neoclassical and endogenous) provide al-
ternative explanation to economic growth in both developed and developing countries.
Neoclassical growth theories highlight technological progress9 as the engine of economic
growth. They provide a means to measure productivity growth and assume that capital
accumulation only drives productivity in the short-run (as capital suffers from diminish-
8He emphasised that increased imports leads to increased competitive pressure on domestic firms to
improve their technologies which helps reduce domestic monopoly power that holds production below
and prices above socially optimal levels
9On the balanced growth path in the Solow model, for example, the growth rate of output per worker
is determined solely by the rate of technological progress. See Romer (2001)
6
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ing returns in the long run). This makes productivity growth in the long run solely the
result of exogenous technical progress meant to provide a vehicle for explaining the rate
of growth of output over time (Zipfel, 2004). Although neoclassical growth theory made
significant contribution to the understanding of economic growth, they did lack empirical
relevance and explanatory power, as for example, their ability to predict economic growth
in the long run. For this reason, macroeconomic research for about 15 years focused on
short-run fluctuations when active research on growth theory effectively died by the early
1970s (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004). Endogenous growth theories, on the other hand,
provide additional explanation of sustained productivity and output growth, and most
importantly of the openness-growth nexus. They provide “enough theoretical support
for the positive relationship between trade openness and economic growth” (Edwards,
1998) and economic explanation for why capital might in the long run not suffer from
diminishing returns (Romer, 2001). They depart from treating technological progress as
exogenous and assume rather that, technological progress results from the allocation of
resources to the creation of new ideas10. This makes improvement in technology and the
process of economic growth itself understood as an endogenous outcome of the economy.
Trade openness is seen as one of the engines that would foster the needed techno-
logical progress, highlighted in neoclassical and endogenous growth theories. It makes
it possible for poor countries access intermediate inputs and technology transfer from
more advanced countries, promotes exports by reducing anti-export bias, generates pos-
itive spillovers through exploiting scale economies, and encourages competitiveness and
efficiency in both domestic and international markets (Balassa, 1978; Feder, 1982; Gross-
man and Helpman, 1991; Rodrik, 1999; Manning, 2005; Kaplan and Aslan, 2006). For
a developing country such as Ghana, greater openness to trade may bring about the up-
grading of skills through the importation of superior technology and innovation (Aryeetey,
2005). These ideas stimulated the unprecedented wave for unilateral trade reforms in the
10Thus the model, instead of assuming that economic growth occurs because of automatic improvements
in technology, is rather focused on the understanding of the economic forces that underlie technological
progress
7
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1980s, for many developing countries (Greenaway et al., 2002) because greater openness
plays a vital role in shaping the economic and social performance and prosperity of coun-
tries (UNCTAD, 2005). For these reasons, the empirical results have generally indicated
a positive relationship between trade openness and economic growth11. However, the
strength of the link has greatly depended on whether the specification uses time series,
cross-section or panel data techniques, the time period considered, the problem of data,
and the measurement and potential endogeneity of trade openness itself (see Sachs and
Warner, 1995; Harrison, 1996; Dollar and Kraay, 2001; Kaplan and Aslan, 2006). More-
over, although neoclassical and endogenous growth theories predict that higher trade can
increase growth globally, a subset may experience slower growth depending on their initial
condition and level of technological progress, making the openness-growth debate still an
empirical question12. Lee et al. (2004) used identification through heteroskedasticity to
address potential endogeneity of trade openness for 100 countries over the 1961-2000 pe-
riod and concluded that trade openness have a positive impact on growth, although this
effect is small in magnitude. The present study recognises these estimation problems and
agrees with earlier researchers that trade openness measures are not free from method-
ological problems. This is important because different trade openness measures capture
different aspects of openness in general. However, Harrison (1996) argues that, regardless
of the many trade openness measures that exist in the literature, the simplest ones are
those based on actual trade flows, such as the sum of exports and imports (% of GDP).
We use this measure as a proxy for trade openness in this study.
1.2.2 Foreign Aid
Foreign aid, on the other hand, is seen as another important variable that should com-
plement trade openness boost technological progress and domestic investment, and hence
long run growth. The argument for foreign aid is evident in the standard theoretical “two-
gap” model of (Chenery and Strout, 1966), the empirical work of (Papanek, 1972, 1973)
11See (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Harrison, 1996; Dollar and Kraay, 2001; Lee et al., 2004)
12See, for example, Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001)
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and the emergence of the twin peak phenomenon (Quah, 1997; Sachs, 2005; Sala-i-Martin,
2006). As noted in the “two-gap” model, developing countries faces two fundamental fi-
nancing gaps: the investment-saving and the import-foreign exchange gaps, that foreign
aid is to fill (Papanek, 1973; Easterly, 2003). It supplements insufficient domestic savings
by providing foreign income for the importation of desired capital goods to augment the
level of capital stock used for domestic production (Hudson, 2004). It is believed that an
aid-financed imports and investment would be growth enhancing for the many develop-
ing countries constrained with savings and foreign exchange earnings. This phenomenon
has led many developing countries become highly dependent on foreign aid, and it is not
surprising that following the Monterrey consensus in 2002 (based on the need to help
achieve the MDGs by 2015) developed countries pledged massive inflow of foreign aid to
developing countries13. In spite of the theoretical support for foreign aid to developing
countries as a growth enhancing policy variable, the empirical evidence is one that has
received divergent views over the past few decades. These views have often focused on
whether foreign aid have significant positive impact on growth or not, and/or whether cer-
tain conditions are required by foreign aid donors and the recipient country’s government
for aid to have significant positive impact on growth.
Foreign aid optimists argue for a positive relationship between foreign aid and eco-
nomic growth14. For example, Gomanee et al. (2005) in a sample of 25 sub-Saharan
African countries for the 1970-1997 period argued that foreign aid has a significant posi-
tive impact on growth and for that matter the poor economic growth performance of many
African countries should not be attributed to aid ineffectiveness. Nonetheless, the argu-
ment of other optimists have been more “conditional”15. Whilst proponents like (Burnside
and Dollar, 2000; Collier and Dollar, 2002) have argued that foreign aid appears to be
effective but only in countries with good economic policies and institutional environment,
others like (Collier and Dehn, 2001; Guillaumont and Chauvet, 2001; Dalgaard et al.,
13Sachs (2005) provides further evidence for the need for such massive foreign aid inflows to these
countries
14See (Papanek, 1973; Gupta and Islam, 1983; Gomanee et al., 2005; Karras, 2006)
15Readers interested in a comprehensive survey on this point should consult (Roodman, 2007)
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2004) argue that foreign aid is rather effective inn countries with more vulnerable eco-
nomic conditions and/or outside the tropics (i.e. export prices shocks, terms of trade
volatility, and geographical considerations). For example, Burnside and Dollar (2000)
argues that “aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fis-
cal, monetary, and trade policies but has little effect in the presence of poor policies”
for a sample covering the 1970-1993 period. For this reason, if foreign aid is allocated
optimally and combined with good policies should have positive impact on growth. This
result have made the argument for foreign aid today moved away from conditionality to
policy selectivity - where foreign aid is now targeted to developing countries with track
record of good policies and the right institutional environment (Easterly, 2003; Baulch,
2006; Bourguignon and Leipziger, 2006). In addition, foreign aid though can have posi-
tive short-run impact on growth, may have detrimental long run growth effect as it may
be subject to decreasing marginal returns over the long-term (Lensink and White, 2001;
Clemens et al., 2004). For instance, Clemens et al. (2004) argues that foreign aid does
not have robust long run effect on growth, although in the short-run some types of foreign
aid may be growth enhancing. This may be the result of foreign aid being volatile and
the possibility that overreliance on foreign aid undermines innovative ways of increasing
domestic tax revenue and/or encouraging exports when aid is not forthcoming.
Foreign aid pessimists, on the other hand, argue that aid does not have a positive
robust effect on growth. Neither does good policy environment a necessary condition for
aid to be effective as advocated in (Burnside and Dollar, 2000)16. For example, Boone
(1996) finds that foreign aid does not increase investment (and hence economic growth)
as suggested by the “two-gap” model, but rather finance consumption. Easterly (2003)
considered both alternative definitions of “aid”, “policies” and “growth” for the same
sample period and an expanded sample covering the 1970 to 1997 period, but the same
definitions of variables as in (Burnside and Dollar, 2000). Easterly concluded that in both
cases good policy is not a necessary condition for aid to have positive impact on growth. In
16See (Mosley, 1980; Boone, 1996; Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Easterly, 2003; Easterly et al., 2004; Rajan
and Subramanian 2005)
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a comprehensive empirical investigation, Rajan and Subramanian (2005) used both cross-
section and panel data techniques, over different time periods and considered different
kinds of foreign aid. They concluded that no evidence exists to support the argument that
foreign aid works better in good policy, institutional and/or geographical environment or
that the kind of foreign aid17 matter for growth. In addition, Roodman (2007) investigated
the robustness of the results of seven foreign aid and economic growth papers18 and
concluded that the results on whether aid is effective under good policies, vulnerable
economic conditions, subject to diminishing returns, and/or works better outside the
tropics but not in them among others are only fragile when the sample size is extended.
1.2.3 Summary
The discussion on the relationship between trade openness, foreign aid and economic
growth, though inconclusive does not mean the factors identified in the literature may
not have effect on aid effectiveness and the impact that trade openness have on economic
growth. For example, the results on the relationship between foreign aid and economic
growth rather indicates that a strong coordination and partnership is required between
both foreign aid donors and recipient country’s government on the best institutional
framework under which foreign aid could be effective in order to impact positively on
long-term growth, as the effect of these conditions may differ from country to country.
For this reason, that country-level study on whether trade openness and foreign aid inflows
impact positive on long-term growth becomes particularly important.
1.3 Estimation Method
1.3.1 Model Specification and The Data
To investigate the impact of trade openness and foreign aid on economic growth in Ghana,
we specify an empirical growth model that introduces trade openness, foreign aid and their
17Short/long impact aid and/or bilateral/multilateral aid
18(Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Guillaumont and Chauvet, 2001; Collier and
Dehn, 2001; Collier and Dollar, 2002; Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2004; Dalgaard et al., 2004)
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interaction term as additional explanatory variables to labour force growth, gross domestic
investment, government expenditure, political system and labour force participation rate
as:
RGDPPCGt = α0 + β1LABFGt + β2lnGDIt + β3lnOPENt + β4lnAIDt +
β5(lnOPEN ∗ lnAID)t + β6lnGEXPt +
β7PSY STEMt + β8lnLFPRt + et (1.1)
where RGDPPCG is the growth rate of real GDP per capita, LABFG is the growth
rate of the labour force, GDI is the capital stock, which is proxied by the share of gross
domestic investment in GDP, OPEN measures trade openness (i.e. (EXPORTS +
IMPORTS)/GDP ), AID is the share of foreign aid in GDP, GEXP is the share of
government expenditure in GDP, PSY STEM measures the political system, LFPR is
the labour force participation rate, “ln” is the natural logarithmic operator, α0 and βs are
respectively constant and parameters to be estimated, and e is the error term with zero
mean and constant variance. The data for PSY STEM is Polity2 score obtained from
Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009). PSY STEM is a combine measure of the
extent to which a country is autocratic or democratic and it ranges from -10 (strongly
autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic). The rest of the data are obtained from the
World Bank (2010) - African Development Indicators, 2010.
1.3.2 The ARDL Bounds Test
The building of dynamic economic models often entails detailed analysis of the charac-
teristics of the individual time series variables involved (Lutkepohl and Kratzig, 2004).
When these characteristics are ignored, and the set of series modelled jointly, the re-
gression results obtained may exhibit a high level of correlation between the variables.
Nonetheless, “the existence of a high degree of correlation between two variables does
not automatically imply the existence of a causal relationship between the variables con-
12
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cerned” (Holden and Thomson, 1992). This correlation may be “spurious”19. However,
if two or more variables are cointegrated then the cointegration relationship among the
variables rules out the possibility of the estimated relationship being “spurious” (Engle
and Granger, 1987). Cointegration test such as the Engle-Granger two-step (Engle and
Granger, 1987), Johansen maximum likelihood (Johansen and Juselius, 1990), Phillips
and Hansen (Phillips and Hansen, 1990) among others rely on strictly I(1) variables. The
reason being that if all the variables are I(1), then there are special cases where a linear
combination result in an I(0) variable and hence cointegration (Asterius and Hall, 2007).
However, the requirement of I(1) variables often makes estimates of these cointegration
test subject to biases. This is the case as the order of integration of a variable often
depends on the type of unit root test, the choice of optimal lag length, and whether a
constant and/or trend is included in the underlying unit root test.
The present study overcomes some of these problems by employing the ARDL bounds
test. The method allows the estimation of the long run level relationship between variables
and its choice is motivated by key benefits it has over strictly I(1) variables dependent
cointegration tests. Firstly, the method yields valid results irrespective of whether the
underlying variables are I(0), I(1), or a combination of both20. This is important when it
becomes difficult to treat a variable as either I(0) or I(1), although it may not necessarily
be I(2). Secondly, the method is asymptotically efficient in finite and small sample study21
and applicable even in the case where the regressors are endogenous22. This is appropriate
for the present study with only 24 observations, and the fact that some of our explanatory
variables may be plagued by the endogeneity problem. Thirdly, the method allows the
introduction of optimal lags of both the dependent and independent variables. Thus,
different variables are allowed to have their optimal speed of adjustment to equilibrium.
Last but not the least, OLS is easily employed to estimate the cointegration relationship.
19It exists regardless of the sample size and makes the existence of a long run relationship between
variables hardly possible. See Granger and Newbold (1974) for more details
20For this reason, the order of integration need not be the same for all variables, as is the case for
cointegration methods that relies on strictly I(1) variables
21For more details, see Pattichis (1999) who used only 20 observation covering the 1975-1994 period
22See Alam and Quazzi (2003)
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In what follows, we outline the procedure involved in the ARDL bounds test. Based
on equation (1.1) the general ARDL representation of conditional error correction model
(ecm) gives23:
∆RGDPPCGt = α0 +
p∑
i=1
γi∆RGDPPCGt−i +
p1∑
i=0
βi∆LABFGt−i +
p2∑
i=0
δi∆lnGDIt−i +
p3∑
i=0
λi∆lnOPENt−i +
p4∑
i=0
θi∆lnAIDt−i +
p5∑
i=0
ρi∆(lnOPEN ∗ lnAID)t−i +
p6∑
i=0
ϑi∆lnGEXPt−i +
p7∑
i=0
ψi∆PSY STEMt−i +
p8∑
i=0
ωi∆lnLFPRt−i + φ1RGDPPCGt−1 + φ2LABFGt−1 +
φ3lnGDIt−1 + φ4lnOPENt−1 + φ5lnAIDt−1 +
φ6(lnOPEN ∗ lnAID)t−1 + φ7lnGEXPt−1 +
φ8PSY STEMt−1 + φ9lnLFPRt−1 + t (1.2)
where all variables are as previously defined and ∆ is the first difference operator. Next, we
choose the maximum lag (p = 1) for the ARDL model selection. This is reasonable given
the annual series in our sample and the short time span considered. However, in selecting
the optimum lag structure for the ARDL (p, p1, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6, p7, p8) model we use the
Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC). We then compute the F-statistic to trace the pres-
ence of cointegration by testing the null hypothesis of no cointegration restricting the coef-
ficients of the lagged level variables equal to zero (i.e H0 : φ1=φ2=φ3=φ4=φ5=φ6=φ7=φ8=
φ9=0 against the alternative hypothesis that H1 : φ1 6=φ2 6=φ3 6=φ4 6=φ5 6=φ6 6=φ7 6=φ8 6=φ9 6=0)
by estimating equation (1.2) by OLS. The approach involved in computing the F-statistic
(see Pesaran and Pesaran, 2009) first estimate
23In this study, we are only interested in the case with RGDPPCG as the dependent variable. However,
the method allows representation for the regressors as the dependent variable
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∆RGDPPCGt = α0 +
p∑
i=1
γi∆RGDPPCGt−i +
p1∑
i=0
βi∆LABFGt−i +
p2∑
i=0
δi∆lnGDIt−i +
p3∑
i=0
λi∆lnOPENt−i +
p4∑
i=0
θi∆lnAIDt−i +
p5∑
i=0
ρi∆(lnOPEN ∗ lnAID)t−i +
p6∑
i=0
ϑi∆lnGEXPt−i +
p7∑
i=0
ψi∆PSY STEMt−i +
p8∑
i=0
ωi∆lnLFPRt−i + vt (1.3)
by OLS. A variable addition test is then applied to equation (1.3) by including the lagged
level variables φ1RGDPPCGt−1, φ2LABFGt−1, φ3lnGDIt−1, φ4lnOPENt−1, φ5lnAIDt−1,
φ6(lnOPEN ∗ lnAID)t−1, φ7lnGEXPt−1, φ8PSY STEMt−1, φ9lnLFPRt−1. Microfit 5.0
provide the F-statistic for the selected ARDL model with two sets of asymptotic critical
values bounds, based on whether all variables are I(0) for the lower bound or I(1) for
the upper bound. We report the 90% and 95% critical value bounds provided by Microfit
5.024. The null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected if the computed F-statistic is
greater than the upper bound critical value. On the other hand, we cannot reject the null
of no cointegration if the computed F-statistic is less than the lower bound critical value.
However, if it happens that the computed F-statistic falls within these two bounds then
the results will be inconclusive and additional information will be required before a con-
clusive inference can be made (see Pesaran et al., 2001). The asymptotic distribution of
the critical values bounds, are non-standard under the null hypothesis of no cointegration
relationship in levels and are computed by stochastic simulations.
Once, the existence of a long run level cointegration relationship is confirmed we esti-
mate the long run and short-run model parameters. For the long run model parameters,
24The critical value bounds are still valid with the inclusion of dummy variables amongst the deter-
ministic variables. See Pesaran and Pesaran (2009)
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we estimate the following conditional long-run model for RGDPPCGt:
RGDPPCGt = α0 +
p∑
i=1
φ1iRGDPPCGt−i +
p1∑
i=0
φ2iLABFGt−i +
p2∑
i=0
φ3ilnGDIt−i +
p3∑
i=0
φ4ilnOPENt−i +
p4∑
i=0
φ5ilnAIDt−i +
p5∑
i=0
φ6i(lnOPEN ∗ lnAID)t−i +
p6∑
i=0
φ7ilnGEXPt−i +
p7∑
i=0
φ8iPSY STEMt−i +
p8∑
i=0
φ9ilnLFPRt−i + ut (1.4)
where ut is the error term, and the long run model parameters are derived based on φs
25.
For the short-run model parameters we estimate the ecm:
∆RGDPPCGt = α0 +
p∑
i=1
γi∆RGDPPCGt−i +
p1∑
i=0
βi∆LABFGt−i +
p2∑
i=0
δi∆lnGDIt−i +
p3∑
i=0
λi∆lnOPENt−i +
p4∑
i=0
θi∆lnAIDt−i +
p5∑
i=0
ρi∆(lnOPEN ∗ lnAID)t−i +
p6∑
i=0
ϑi∆lnGEXPt−i +
p7∑
i=0
ψi∆PSY STEMt−i +
p8∑
i=0
ωi∆lnLFPRt−i + ηectt−1 + ut (1.5)
where ut is the error term, β, δ, λ, θ, ρ, ϑ, ψ and ω denotes the short-run impact
multipliers, and η is the coefficient of the lagged error correction term (ectt−1) which
measures the speed of adjustment to equilibrium or the extent of disequilibrium correction.
25Specifically φ21−φ1 ,
φ3
1−φ1 ,
φ4
1−φ1 ,
φ5
1−φ1 ,
φ6
1−φ1 ,
φ7
1−φ1 ,
φ8
1−φ1 and
φ9
1−φ1 defines the long run model param-
eters. Note that these are the estimates of long run coefficients (βs) in equation (1.1)
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1.3.3 Testing for Unit Root
In order to be sure that all variables are not I(2) and to ensure that structural break is not
a problem, we determine the time series properties of individual variables that enter our
empirical growth model. We adopt the Dickey-Fuller Generalised Least Squares (DF-GLS)
unit root test, proposed by [Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock (ERS, 1996)], the Kwiatkowski,
Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (KPSS) unit root test with the null hypothesis that the series
are stationary, proposed by (Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin, 1992) and the unit
root test due to Lee and Strazicich (2001, 2003) that takes into consideration the impact
of structural breaks. The choice of the DF-GLS unit root test, in particular, is motivated
by the fact that it has become more preferred to the traditional ADF and PP tests that
are known to suffer severe finite sample power and size distortions. DF-GLS is more
efficient as it exhibits the best overall small sample size performance and “substantially
improved power when an unknown mean or trend is present” [Elliot, Rothenberg and
Stock (ERS, 1996)] in the underlying time series. The test first applies a generalised least
square detrending (demeaning) to the data, prior to running an Augmented Dickey-Fuller
(ADF) regression. This leads to improved power of the test in the differenced series when
a large AR root is present and minimises size distortions in the presence of large negative
MA root. Another important feature of the test is on the choice of the optimal lag length
p, which is based on Ng and Perron (1995) sequential t test, SIC and the Ng and Perron
(2001) modified AIC (MAIC) criterion. The null hypothesis that the series have unit root
is tested against the alternative that the series have no unit root26. The approximate
critical values obtained from [Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock (ERS, 1996)] are reported
with the test. The test results are summarised in Table 1.127. All test results allow us to
treat all variables as either I(1) or I(0).
26We computed the DF-GLS unit root test using the “DFGLS” routine in Stata
27Not reported, we also computed the KPSS unit root test using the “KPSS” routine in Stata and
the unit root test due to Lee and Strazicich (2001, 2003) using the procedure available in RATS. All not
reported results are available upon request
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Table 1.1: DF-GLS unit root test results
Level First-differences
Variable Intercept + Trend Intercept Intercept + Trend Intercept
RGDPPCG -3.485** 2.319**
LABFG 0.751 -1.153 -3.105* -4.999***
lnGDI -0.827 1.187 -5.812*** -5.290***
lnOPEN -1.782 -0.956 -4.342*** -4.116***
lnAID -2.382 -2.073** -6.556*** -5.513***
lnOPEN ∗ lnAID -2.355 -1.887* -7.020*** -5.703***
lnGEXP -2.464 -1.745* -3.662** -3.155***
PSY STEM -2.959* -0.162 -4.717*** -1.725***
lnLFPR -2.579 -2.141** -2.980* -2.212***
Note: ***(**)[*] indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root at 1%(5%)[10%]
level. The approximate critical values at the 1%, 5% and 10% level for model with
trend (no trend) are respectively -3.770 (-2.660), -3.190 (-1.950) and -2.890 (-1.600)
1.4 Empirical Results and Discussion
The empirical results from the estimated ARDL models needed for the discussion are
presented in Tables 1.2-1.5. All computations are done using Microfit 5.0. For all Tables,
we report in column [2] the results for equation (1.1). In columns [1], [3], [4] and [5] we
respectively report the results for equation (1.1) without lnLFPR, the results for equa-
tion (1.1) without LABFG, the results for equation (1.1) without lnGDI, and the results
for equation (1.1) without both LABFG and lnGDI28. The ARDL (1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0,
1), ARDL (1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0), ARDL (1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0), ARDL (1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0,
1, 0) and ARDL (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0) models are respectively selected by SIC. The criti-
cal value bounds reported with the ARDL model in columns [1], [3] and [4] for the 95%
and 90% lower and upper bounds are 3.1917-5.0286 and 2.5759-4.0936 respectively. The
critical value bounds reported with the ARDL model in column [2] for the 95% and 90%
lower and upper bounds are 3.1665-5.0260 and 2.5261-4.1011 respectively. The critical
28With the exception of lnLFPR, we drop the other variables, as they do not enter significant. In this
way, we also check whether the results are robust to alternative specifications. Based on the literature on
growth theory we also introduced private credit, FDI, human capital, remittances, interest rate, inflation
and exchange rate into the analysis. However, these variables were dropped as they were insignificant,
neither does their exclusion affects the estimated models given that all are cointegrated
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value bounds with the ARDL model in column [5] for the 95% and 90% lower and upper
bounds are 3.2981-4.9675 and 2.6485-4.0603 respectively. The results for the computed
F-statistic reported in Table 1.2 reveals that [1], [2], [4] and [5] are significant at the 5%
level while that for [3] is significant at the 10% level. Based on these results, we conclude
that a level long run cointegration relationship exists for all estimated ARDL models.
Tables 1.3-1.5 respectively report the results of the long run coefficients, the short-run
dynamic coefficients and the model diagnostic and stability tests.
Table 1.2: ARDL bounds test for cointegration relationship
Model [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Test statistic 5.2602** 6.1355** 4.8347* 6.1462** 5.4613**
Note: **(*) indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration at
5%(10%) significance level. The critical value bounds are computed by stochas-
tic simulation using 20000 replications
In line with neoclassical growth theory, LABFG enters with the correct sign (nega-
tive) but insignificant at any conventional level in both the short-run and the long run as
in [1], [2] and [4]. However, lnLFPR enters negative and statistically significant in both
the short-run and the long run in [2]-[5]. The estimated long run and short-run coeffi-
cients on lnGDI enters positive in [1] and negative in [2]-[3]29, but they are all statistically
insignificant at any conventional level. The estimated long run and short-run coefficients
on lnGEXP enters negative and statistically significant in both the short-run and the
long run for all estimated models. The result indicates that while LABFG and lnGDI
does not have statistically significant short-run and long run impact on RGDPPCG,
lnLFPR and lnGEXP have detrimental short-run and long run effects on RGDPPCG.
Although the results on lnGDI is quite surprising (as we would have expected lnGDI to
have statistically significant positive impact on RGDPPCG), the result on lnLFPR and
29Not reported, we also estimated the model in [1], [2] and [3] with the “ln” of gross fixed capital
formation (% of GDP), in place of lnGDI, but did not affect the final results. Gross fixed capital
formation (% of GDP) enters positive in all models but statistically insignificant
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lnGEXP are not surprising considering the quality of labour force, frequent industrial
actions, the way the labour market is regulated and the expenditure patterns of govern-
ment. As Nketiah-Amponsah (2009) note,“increases in government expenditure without
corresponding increase in managerial efficiency have been the bane of Ghana’s economic
growth”. Moreover, the labour market is mostly characterised by labour intensive agricul-
ture and petty trading with limited employment benefits (Oteng-Abayie and Frimpong,
2006). The combined effect of the characteristics of the labour market, the possibility
that government spending is in non-productive sectors (including payment of wage bills
to “ghost” workers, common in many low income countries) and the possibility of di-
minishing marginal returns to capital may explain to some extent why lnGDI, LABFG,
lnLFPR and lnGEXP does not have significant positive impact on RGDPPCG.
Table 1.3: Estimated long run coefficients using the ARDL approach
Regressor [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
LABFG -0.245 -0.118 -0.122
[0.625] [0.433] [0.402]
lnGDI 0.073 -0.047 -0.112
[1.588] [1.033] [0.982]
lnOPEN 28.827** 18.510** 18.875** 18.486** 18.850**
[12.672] [7.603] [7.348] [7.224] [7.034]
lnAID 79.510** 42.652* 43.555** 42.673** 43.693**
[31.319] [19.247] [18.612] [17.808] [17.808]
lnOPEN ∗ lnAID -17.855** -9.827** -10.017** -9.835** -10.055**
[7.011] [4.311] [4.174] [4.106] [3.991]
lnGEXP -6.152* -6.734** -7.032*** -6.760*** -7.125***
[3.205] [2.146] [1.820] [1.975] [1.566]
PSY STEM 0.689* 0.504*** 0.525*** 0.503*** 0.524***
[0.238] [0.142] [0.118] [0.132] [0.112]
lnLFPR -102.487** -105.275** -102.344** -105.188**
[36.057] [33.765] [34.227] [32.341]
INTERCEPT -109.765* 380.047** 390.846** 379.513** 390.561**
[52.132] [162.223] [153.357] [154.182] [146.916]
Note: Dependent variable RGDPPCG. In parenthesis are standard errors. ***(**)[*]
indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at 1%(5%)[10%] significance level
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On the contrary, the estimated long run and short-run coefficient on PSY STEM is
positive and significant in the long run, although this is not captured in the short-run.
This result indicates that, the political system although enters positive but statistically
insignificant in the short-run have statistically significant positive long run impact on
RGDPPCG. The result may provide further support for a positive impact of democracy
on long run growth, as for a greater part of the study period (1993-2007) Ghana has
enjoyed peaceful democratic governance. The estimated long run and short run coefficients
on lnOPEN and lnAID are positive and statistically significant whilst that on their
interaction term lnOPEN ∗ lnAID is negative and statistically significant. The result
indicates that both lnOPEN and lnAID have positive and statistically significant long
run and short-run impact onRGDPPCG. However, the total effect that lnOPEN and/or
lnAID have on RGDPPCG is somewhat reduced by their interaction term lnOPEN ∗
lnAID in both the long run and the short-run. The result of the positive impact that
both trade openness and foreign aid have on economic growth provide further support for
the theoretical predictions of positive impact that these policy variables have on long-term
growth, although this effect may not necessarily be evident in all aid receiving developing
countries that for the past few decades have adopted liberalisation policies aimed at
improving economic performance.
The ecm results suggest satisfactory statistical fit and adequacy of the estimated mod-
els to the data. This is supported by the following statistical tests. The F -statistics are
highly significant (at the 1% significance level). The R − bar2 of approximately 0.90 is
really impressive and indicates that the included explanatory variables are capable of ex-
plaining approximately 90% of the short-run variations in RGDPPCG. The results are
not “spurious” as the coefficient on ecm(−1) of approximately 0.53 or more (associated
with the long run relationship) is negative, considerably high in absolute magnitude and
highly significant (at the 1% significance level). This provides further evidence on the ex-
istence of stable long run level cointegration relationship. The negative and statistically
significant coefficient on ecm(−1) means that there is no problem of adjustment in the
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Table 1.4: Error-correction representation of the selected ARDL models
Regressor [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
∆LABFG -0.219 -0.077 -0.080
[0.359] [0.288] [0.268]
∆lnGDI 0.039 -0.031 -0.071
[0.840] [0.674] [0.628]
∆lnOPEN 22.341*** 17.298*** 17.208*** 17.310*** 17.227***
[4.734] [4.239] [4.043] [4.035] [3.874]
∆lnAID 44.845*** 31.017*** 31.085*** 31.054*** 31.178***
[10.586] [9.942] [9.510] [9.449] [9.074]
∆(lnOPEN ∗ lnAID) -9.431*** -6.411*** -6.405*** -6.421*** -6.429***
[2.356] [2.201] [2.106] [2.089] [2.008]
∆lnGEXP -3.249** -4.393*** -4.496*** -4.413*** -4.555***
[1.414] [1.212] [1.098] [1.077] [0.928]
∆PSY STEM 0.132 0.092 0.097 0.092 0.096
[0.112] [0.091] [0.085] [0.086] [0.082]
∆lnLFPR -66.860** -67.316** -66.815** -67.252**
[25.054] [23.916] [23.873] [22.905]
ecm(−1) -0.528*** -0.652*** -0.639*** -0.653*** -0.639***
[0.114] [0.125] [0.110] [0.119] [0.106]
R− bar2 0.813 0.880 0.891 0.891 0.900
F -statistic 13.396*** 19.326*** 23.738*** 23.911*** 29.560**
DW -statistic 2.227 2.523 2.489 2.519 2.476
Note: Dependent variable ∆RGDPPCG. In parenthesis are standard errors.
***(**) indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at 1%(5%) significance level.
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long run in case of shocks in the short-run (i.e. a considerable high speed of adjustment to
long run equilibrium every year after a short-run shock). In addition, the model diagnostic
test statistics fulfil the conditions of no specification errors, structural stability, normality
of residuals and homoskedasticity. The stability tests further confirm the stability of the
estimated coefficients.
Table 1.5: Diagnostic (LM version) and stability test for selected ARDL models
Diagnostic/Stability Test [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Serial Correlation 0.614 2.541 1.847 2.403 1.737
[0.433] [0.111] [0.174] [0.121] [0.188]
Functional Form 0.018 0.480 0.211 0.409 0.223
[0.893] [0.488] [0.646] [0.523] [0.637]
Normality 0.983 2.227 1.789 2.273 1.832
[0.612] [0.328] [0.409] [0.321] [0.400]
Heteroskedasticity 0.224 0.467 0.398 0.484 0.511
[0.636] [0.494] [0.528] [0.486] [0.431]
CUSUM Stable Stable Stable Stable Stable
CUSUMSQ Stable Stable Stable Stable Stable
Note: Probability values in parenthesis
1.5 Conclusions and Policy Implications
The stylised facts about economic growth is that it is a function of many variables that for
many developing countries trade openness and foreign aid becomes particularly important.
This study investigated the level long run level cointegration relationship between trade
openness, foreign aid and economic growth in post-liberalisation Ghana (i.e. over the
period 1984-2007) using the ARDL bounds test. The study estimated economic growth
model that considered trade openness, foreign aid and their interaction term as well as a
number of other important determinants of economic growth.
The empirical results suggest that, although the total short-run and long run positive
impact that trade openness and foreign aid have on economic growth is somewhat reduced
by their interaction term, both trade openness and foreign aid have been beneficial to
23
24
Trade Openness, Foreign Aid and Economic Growth in Post-libera-
lisation Ghana: An Application of ARDL Bounds Test
economic growth in Ghana, since the adoption of liberalisation policies in 1983. The result
is not surprising as Ghana is currently named among the star performers in efforts to reach
the MDGs by 2015. The result further reveals that there are long run growth benefits
of the political system currently operating in Ghana. However, due to the negative and
statistically significant short-run and long run impact that both labour force participation
rate and the share of government expenditure in GDP have on economic growth, it is
recommended that the government pay particular attention to its expenditure and the
labour market if Ghana aims to achieve an upper middle-income status by the year 2015.
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Chapter 2
Economic Globalisation, Democracy
and Income in Sub-Saharan Africa:
A Panel Cointegration Analysis
2.1 Introduction
The past few decades have seen a resurgence of research on the impact of economic
globalisation and democracy on economic performance of developing countries. Does
economic globalisation and democracy go hand in hand to impact positive on economic
performance of developing countries in the long run? For sub-Saharan Africa (SSA),
most governments prior to the 1980s were very skeptical on the success of opening their
economies to international competition. However, this perception changed in the early
1980s and the result has been the adoption of trade and financial liberalisation policies
for many of these countries (Rudra, 2005). Democracy, on the other hand, was virtually
not in existence in SSA prior to the 1990s as many impediments1 existed that undermined
democratisation (Ndulu and O’Connell, 1999; Brown, 2005). Nonetheless, as Fosu (2008)
note, democracy became important in SSA beginning in the early 1990s as it was expected
1As Brown (2005) note, such impediments mainly constituted lack of formal institutional structures
(including rule of law) conducive for sustaining the immediate survival of democracy
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would help improve the dismal economic performance that had existed for decades.
The arguments in favour of economic globalisation as a determinant of economic per-
formance are well documented in the literature. For example, Dreher (2006), Chang
and Lee (2010) and Villaverde and Maza (2011) have argued that economic globalisa-
tion is conducive for economic performance, although this effect is small in magnitude.
For many developing countries, economic globalisation (in particular trade liberalisation)
became important, due to the perceived ineffectiveness of foreign aid as an “engine”
of development. Trade liberalisation makes possible to import intermediate inputs to
augment domestic savings, as well as the exploitation of economics of scale and tech-
nological/knowledge spillovers (McKinnon, 1964; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Marin,
1992; Prasad et al., 2003). Financial liberalisation on the other hand has the potential to
stimulate the development of the domestic financial sector for long-term growth (Levine,
1996; Henry, 2000). Therefore, economic globalisation would in general play a critical role
as a catalyst for economic prosperity in the developing world.
Many empirical studies on the relationship between economic globalisation and eco-
nomic performance have focused on specific dimensions of economic globalisation (mainly
trade and financial liberalisation). The most interesting discussion on the link between
economic globalisation and economic performance is the contrast between empirical pa-
pers on trade and financial liberalisation. For example, trade liberalisation has often
reported statistically significant positive relationship with income and/or growth (see Bal-
assa, 1978, 1985; Ram, 1985, 1987; Sachs and Warner, 1995; Harrison, 1996, Thornton,
1996; Dalley and Kraay, 2001; Ibrahim and MacPhee, 2003; Yanikkaya, 2003; Abual-Foul,
2004). However, the result of a positive impact of financial liberalisation especially for
developing countries has been limited, although the financial integration of developing
countries to the global economy has increased in recent decades (Prasad et al., 2003)2.
For example, Edwards (2001) note that financial liberalisation is conducive for economic
2Prasad et al. (2003) further note that for developing countries financial liberalisation is neither a
necessary nor sufficient condition for economic performance, as over the period 1970-2000 for example,
Botswana relatively closed to capital flows achieved strong growth rates whilst Peru relatively open to
capital flows suffered a decline in growth rates
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performance in high-income countries but not in low-income countries. Moreover, not all
developing countries have benefited adequately from capital flows as the inflows of capi-
tal have only been confined to a few developing countries, with the majority left behind
(Mishkin, 2007). One reason being that many developing countries are characterised by
low institutional quality (Alfaro et al., 2005). For these reasons, the predictions of theo-
retical models on the benefits of financial liberalisation for developing countries are not
evident so far.
The accession of SSA countries to the global economy3 has been achieved through
trade and financial liberalisation programmes initiated by the IMF, the World Bank and
the WTO. However, the choice of trade and/or financial liberalisation policies involves
a political component. According to Gordon (1996), “the single most important char-
acteristic of recent political change in sub-Saharan Africa is the diminished ability of
the states to monopolize the political, economic, and institutional environments as they
had since independence”. Moreover, although the benefits of economic globalisation can
fully be realised when combined with improvements in governance and democratic institu-
tions (Gordon, 1996), trade and financial liberalisation have both economic and political
consequences. For many developing countries “globalization has provided the best oppor-
tunities for political democracies and good governance” (Marquardt, 2007). As Sorensen
(2010) note, an important element associated with democratisation is the support of a
market-based economy. Thus, while economic globalisation may pave the way for democ-
racy, this may also have the potential to develop market-oriented policies4 that may or
may not be conducive for a better economic performance. Moreover, the simultaneous
adoption or the interaction of both economic globalisation and democratisation, though
may also have short-run conflicting impact on economic performance, have the poten-
3SSA countries have been involved in numerous bilateral and multilateral development partnership
agreements with the external world for decades. Recent agreements have included the New Partnership for
Africa’s Development (NEPAD), the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA), Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPIC) Initiative and Aid for Trade (AFT), all aimed at improving economic performance of
the sub-region
4For a discussion on the relationship between economic globalisation and democracy readers are re-
ferred to (Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005; Eichengreen and Leblang, 2008)
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tial for a long run complementary role on economic performance (Van De Walle, 1994;
Gordon, 1996). For this reason, if the concept of “policy trilemma”, as discussed in Ro-
drik (2002), is what actually explains the relationships between economic globalisation,
the nation state and democratic politics, then with the current speed (and it seems ir-
reversible nature) of economic globalisation, democratic politics seem to be the choice
alongside economic globalisation with the role of the nation state left at the background
(Bairoch, 2000; Nasstrom, 2003). This result is particularly important for SSA countries,
as economic globalisation would not impact on economic performance in isolation from
democratic institutions5.
Democracy is crucial to economic success (Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005) and it can
affect economic performance through a number of channels. Democratic institutions have
the potential to redistribute income from the rich to the poor, reduce corruption and sup-
port policies encouraging international trade and investment (Acemoglu, 2009; Aghion
and Howitt, 2009). Moreover, in addition to sound macroeconomic policies, democracy
can have an important impact on a country’s ability to attract less volatile capital inflows
(Prasad et al., 2003). It is not surprising that different authors (Barro, 1996; Sala-i-
Martin, 1997; Minier, 1998; Rodrik, 2002; Roll and Talbott, 2003; Rigobon and Rodrik,
2005) provide empirical evidence in support of a positive relationship between democracy
and economic performance. For instance, Roll and Talbott (2003), in a cross-country
investigation for between 134 and 157 countries over the period 1995-1999, find highly
significant positive impact of political rights and civil liberties on Gross National Income
per capita. They further stressed that democratic institutions “allow citizens to provide
feedback to government leaders about the effectiveness of policies and their impact on
general welfare”. Rigobon and Rodrik (2005) used identification through heteroskedastic-
ity to study the interrelationship between rule of law, democracy, openness, and income
and concluded that democracy is good for economic performance.
5A special case in contrast to this point is China that has chosen economic globalisation (without
democracy) and has performed so well in terms of economic performance in recent decades. However, we
do not know if China had performed much better than its present state if it was also a democracy
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Nonetheless, many countries in SSA are not only characterised by low-income (based
on World Bank (2011) - Classification of economies, January 2011)6, but they still remain
non-democracies (Acemoglu et al., 2008). Moreover, although many empirical studies
test specific dimensions of economic globalisation and income, a comprehensive study
on SSA that considers a composite indicator for economic globalisation as well as the
interaction of economic globalisation and democracy is rare. The results of many of the
existing studies are also plagued by estimation problems. For example, the problem of unit
root, cross-section dependence, cross-country heterogeneity and potential endogeneity of
regressors are often not addressed. This study overcome some of these problems. We
use a composite indicator for economic globalisation and several indicators of democracy7
to analyse the relationship between economic globalisation, democracy and income for
SSA countries. We adopt panel data techniques (including panel cointegration analysis)
that allow us to deal with problems of non-stationarity, cross-section dependence, cross-
country heterogeneity and potential endogeneity of regressors. Moreover, we address the
issue of whether the link between economic globalisation, democracy and income can be
considered a long run relationship for SSA countries. The main results of the study, clearly
indicate that, whilst the total long run impact of economic globalisation on income has
been beneficial, the total long run impact of democracy has been the bane of income in
SSA countries. The study concludes that policy reforms should be aimed at improving
democratic institutions in SSA countries for its potential benefits to be realised.
The rest of the study is organised as follows. In section 2.2 we specify the empirical
model to be estimated and a description of the data. In addition, we consider issues of
cross-section dependence in panel data models and provide some preliminary results using
OLS methodology. Section 2.3 describes the panel cointegration techniques. Section 2.4
provides a discussion of the panel cointegration results. Section 2.5 concludes the paper
with some policy implications of the empirical findings.
6Out of 40 low-income economies, 29 are from SSA. In addition, 11 of these economies fall in the
lower-middle-income group. Details on World Bank classification of economies, January 2011 is available
at URL http : //data.worldbank.org/about/country−classifications/country−and− lending−groups
7Details on these indicators are discussed under the data in Section 2.2
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2.2 Empirical Model
2.2.1 Model Specification
To estimate the impact of economic globalisation and democracy on income, we consider
the following model specification:
yit = αi + x
′
itβi + eit, i = 1, ....N, t = 1, ....T (2.1)
where yit is the dependent variable, i is the cross-section dimension for individual coun-
tries, t is the time series dimension of the data, αi denotes country-specific intercept or
fixed-effects, βi = (β1i, β2i, ..., βMi), xit = (x1i,t, x2i,t, ..., xMi,t), m = 1, 2, ...,M where m is
the number of regressors and eit is the error term
8. To define m we consider economic
globalisation, democracy and their interaction term. Therefore, based on equation (2.1)
the following specific equation is estimated:
logYit = αi + β1EGit + β2DMit + β3(EG ∗DM)it + eit (2.2)
where Yit is real per capita GDP (i.e. income), EGit is economic globalisation, DMit
denotes measures of democracy, (EG ∗DM)it is the interaction term between economic
globalisation and democracy, log is the logarithm operator, αi and eit are as previously
defined and β1 to β3 are the parameters of interest to be estimated.
2.2.2 The Data
The panel data consists of annual observations for 31 SSA countries (i.e. N=31) for the
period 1980-2005 (i.e. T=26). The countries included are: Benin; Botswana; Burkina
Faso; Burundi; Cameroon; Central African Republic; Chad; Congo, Republic of; Cote
d’Ivoire; Gabon; Ghana; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Kenya; Lesotho; Madagascar; Malawi;
8Where appropriate the intercept/country-specific fixed-effects αi is extended to include deterministic
time trends. In addition, the intercept, deterministic time trends and the slope coefficients βi are allowed
to vary across individual countries. The inclusion of country-specific fixed-effects and deterministic time
trends allow us to capture any omitted variables assumed to be stable in the long run relationship
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Mali; Mauritania; Niger; Nigeria; Rwanda; Senegal; Sierra Leone; South Africa; Swazi-
land; Tanzania; Togo; Uganda; Zambia; Zimbabwe9. The data have been drawn from
various sources. Data for real GDP per capita is taken from the World Bank (2010)
- African Development Indicators 2010. Data for economic globalisation is taken from
KOF Index of Globalisation 201010. KOF’s economic globalisation index combines data
on trade, foreign direct investment (flows), foreign direct investment (stock), portfolio
investment, income payments to foreign nationals, hidden import barriers, mean tariff
rate, taxes on international trade and capital account restrictions.
The democracy variable is proxied by three indicators11. The first indicator of democ-
racy is Polity2 obtained from Polity IV Project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009). Polity2
is a continuous variable that measures the democratic quality of political regimes us-
ing polity scores; it ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic).
Polity scores (i.e. autocracy score (-10 to 0) and democracy score (+10 to 0) - from
which Polity2 is derived - are themselves derived from a combination of measures: com-
petitiveness of executive recruitment, constraint of chief executive, openness of executive
recruitment, regulation and competitiveness of participation. The second and third indi-
cators of democracy are political rights and political rights + civil liberties respectively.
Data for political rights and civil liberties are obtained from the Heritage Foundation’s
subjective “Index of Economic Freedom” (Freedom House, 2006). These two measures
are based on annual ranking of countries from 1 (the highest rank) to 7 (the lowest rank)
for each measure12. We normalise the three indicators of democracy to range from 0 (full
autocracy) to 1 (full democracy). We denote the three normalised democracy indicators
as PS (Polity2), PR (political rights) and PC (political rights + civil liberties). It is im-
portant to note that, although the three democracy indicators may be highly correlated,
9The selection of countries was influenced by data availability for all variables considered
10Details on KOF’s Index is available at URL http : //globalization.kof.ethz.ch/
11We define democracy in this study as the extent to which the political system is democratic or
nondemocratic
12We combine the two measures (i.e. political rights + civil liberties) for the third indicator of democ-
racy such that the annual ranking of countries ranges from 2 (the highest rank) to 14 (the lowest rank).
Similar approach was adopted in Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994) and Glasure et al. (1999) to measure
overall democracy index
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they are measuring different dimensions of the political system and we should expect that
they have independent implications for income in SSA countries. Additional information
on the data is presented in Appendix A.1.2.
2.2.3 Cross-section Dependence in Panel Data Models
Economic globalisation implies strong and increasing interdependencies between countries
so it is no wonder that the importance to consider the impact of cross-section dependence
in cross-country panels has been emphasised in the literature (see Frees, 1995; Driscoll
and Kraay, 1998; Pesaran, 2004, 2007; De Hoyos and Sarafidis, 2006; Baltagi, 2008). As
De Hoyos and Sarafidis (2006) note, cross-section dependence may be present in cross-
country panels due to unobserved common shocks that become part of the error term.
For this reason, cross-section dependence if present and not accounted for may result in
inconsistent standard errors of the parameters, although the estimated parameters may
be consistent (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998). This effect becomes even more important in
cross-country panels where N > T .
To determine the presence of cross-section dependence the two semiparametric test
proposed by Friedman (1937) and Frees (1995), and the parametric test proposed by
Pesaran (2004) appropriate for N > T panels are employed in this study. The procedures
involved in computing the test statistics as well as the test results are provided in Appendix
A.2. Where appropriate, Tables in this study report in columns I, II and III the model
with PS, PR and PC respectively. The results suggest that there is enough evidence to
reject the null hypothesis of cross-section independence in all estimated models. In the
presence of cross-section dependence Driscoll and Kraay (1998) propose a nonparametric
correction for the standard errors in standard panel data estimators such as pooled OLS.
We provide preliminary results (Table 2.1) using the pooled OLS estimator with Driscoll
and Kraay corrected standard errors.
The coefficient on EG is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for all
estimated models. The coefficient on all indicators of democracy is negative, but statis-
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tically significant only when we consider PS as an indicator of democracy. However, the
result is different when we consider the impact of the interaction terms. All interaction
terms enters positive and statistically significant for all estimated models. It is important
to note that the impact of economic globalisation (democracy) on income is not only cap-
tured by the coefficient on economic globalisation (democracy) but depends also on their
respective interaction terms. For this reason, the results clearly indicate that, the total
effect of economic globalisation on income is positive for all the indicators of democracy
used whilst that of democracy is negative (although this negative effect is not captured
when we consider PR and PC as indicators of democracy as they are insignificant). The
implications we can draw from this results is that whilst economic globalisation has been
beneficial, democracy has not yet regardless of the democracy indicator used.
Table 2.1: Pooled OLS estimates
Variables I II III
EG 0.021*** 0.026*** 0.024***
[0.002] [0.003] [0.004]
PS -1.496***
[0.277]
PR -0.611
[0.507]
PC -0.6762
[0.554]
EG ∗ PS 0.032***
[0.004]
EG ∗ PR 0.019*
[0.010]
EG ∗ PC 0.023*
[0.011]
Note: Dependent variable logY . Driscoll and Kraay
standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***(*)
denote statistical significance at the 1% (10%) level.
Notwithstanding this, an important limitation of the Driscoll and Kraay pooled OLS
estimator is that potential endogeneity problems are not catered for. Moreover, pooled
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OLS estimates are based on stationarity assumption (i.e. for panels where T is of mod-
erate size). For these reasons, we resort to panel cointegration techniques to check the
robustness of these results.
2.3 Panel Cointegration Approach
2.3.1 Testing for Panel Unit Roots
Testing for panel unit roots has become conventional in panel cointegration studies. The
argument in favour of panel unit root tests (as against performing individual unit root
test for each cross-section of the panel) is the increased power associated with the test
especially for N > T panels13. Due to the problem of cross-section dependence in our
panel dataset we only rely on unit root tests that treat this effect. Two alternative unit
root tests, the LLC statistic due to Levin et al. (2002) and the CADF statistic due to
Pesaran (2007), are considered14
The LLC test evaluates the null hypothesis that each individual unit in the panel
contains a unit root against the alternative hypothesis that all individual unit of the
panel is stationary. The test is appropriate for panels of moderate size (i.e. N=10-250 and
T=25-250) and is generalised to allow for “fixed effects, individual deterministic trends
and heterogeneous serially correlated errors” (Baltagi, 2008). Both N and T are allowed
to approach infinity asymptotically. In the presence of cross-section dependence, Levin et
al. (2002) suggest allowing for a limited degree of cross-section dependence by subtracting
cross-sectional averages from the data (i.e. data demeaning). In order to mitigate the
impact of cross-section dependence we demeaned the data when implementing the LLC
test.
Pesaran (2007) provides cross-sectionally augmented Dickey-Fuller (CADF ) test statis-
tic in heterogeneous panels with cross-section dependence. The tests augment the stan-
13See Levin et al. (2002)
14Additional information on LLC and CADF panel unit root tests are provided in Appendix A.3.1.
Readers are also referred to (Levin and Lin, 1992; Levin et al., 2002; Pesaran, 2007) for further technical
details on these tests
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dard ADF regressions with the cross-sectional averages and their first differences to elim-
inate the impact of cross-section dependence. The null hypothesis assumes that all series
are non-stationary versus the alternative hypothesis that only a fraction of the series is
stationary. The asymptotic distribution of CADF is non-standard and asymptotic critical
values are provided for different values of both N and T (see Pesaran, 2007)
The panel unit root test results reported in Appendix A.3.1 suggest that all variables
can be treated as I(1) or integrated of order one. This indicates that the Driscoll and
Kraay pooled OLS results may not be adequate since OLS estimates are based on sta-
tionarity assumption. For this reason, the use of panel cointegration techniques becomes
particularly important.
2.3.2 Testing for Panel Cointegration
In this study we employ Pedroni (1999, 2004) panel cointegration test to determine
whether the variables included in our panel data models are cointegrated15. Pedroni
(1999, 2004) proposes seven panel cointegration test statistics that correct for bias intro-
duced by potentially endogeneous regressors. The test allows “not only the dynamics and
fixed effects to differ across members of the panel, but also that they allow the cointe-
grating vector to differ across members under the alternative” (Pedroni, 1999). For this
reason, all the test statistics are robust in the presence of panel data heterogeneity. More-
over, in the presence of cross-section dependence (most importantly in small samples),
Pedroni suggest including common time dummies to mitigate this effect. This is impor-
tant as Pedroni’s test is only valid on the assumption that any cross-sectional correlations
are captured by an aggregate time effect.
Four of Pedroni’s tests are based on within-dimension of the panel (panel cointegration
test statistics): panel v-statistic, panel ρ-statistic, panel t-statistic (non-parametric) and
panel t-statistic (parametric). The other three (that allows for potential heterogeneity
across individual members of the panel) are based on between-dimension of the panel
15Pedroni’s panel cointegration test is an extension of the Engle and Granger (1987) two-step procedure
applied to panel data
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(group mean panel cointegration test statistics): group ρ-statistic, group t-statistic (non-
parametric) and group t-statistic (parametric).
These tests are particularly appropriate as they are applied to the estimated regression
residuals after the panel statistics have been normalised with correction terms. The
procedure involved in computing the seven test statistics as well as the test results are
provided in Appendix A.3.2. The panel cointegration test results suggest that there is
enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration for all estimated models.
In other words, the link between economic globalisation, democracy and income can be
considered a long run relationship.
2.3.3 Estimation of Panel Cointegration Regression
Given that we find panel cointegration, we need to estimate the associated long run
cointegration parameters. The OLS estimator is known to yield biased and inconsistent
estimates. For this reason, several estimators have been proposed. For example, Kao and
Chiang (2000) argue that their parametric panel Dynamic OLS (DOLS) estimator (that
pools the data along the within-dimension of the panel) is promising in small samples and
performs well in general in cointegrated panels. However, the panel DOLS due to Kao
and Chiang (2000) does not consider the importance of cross-sectional heterogeneity in
the alternative hypothesis. To allow for cross-sectional heterogeneity in the alternative
hypothesis, endogeneity and serial correlation problems to obtain consistent and asymp-
totically unbiased estimates of the cointegrating vectors, Pedroni (2000; 2001) proposed
the group mean Fully Modified OLS (FMOLS) estimator for cointegrated panels.
The group mean FMOLS estimator (which is based on the between-dimension of
the panel) applies a semi-parametric correction to the OLS estimator and it produces
t-statistics that allows for more flexibility in the alternative hypothesis. Pedroni (2001)
argues that pooling the data along the between-dimension of the panel has a more useful
interpretation as the mean value of the cointegrating vectors in heterogeneous panels.
Moreover, the group mean FMOLS estimator generates consistent estimates in small
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samples and does not suffer from large size distortions, in the presence of endogeneity
and heterogeneous dynamics (as it allows for heterogeneity in the fixed effects and in the
short run dynamics). In the presence of cross-section dependence, Pedroni (2001) suggest
estimating the model with common time dummies to mitigate this effect. We employ
the group mean FMOLS estimator to estimate the long run cointegration parameters in
equation (2.2). The procedure involved in estimating the panel group mean FMOLS is
provided in Appendix A.4. However, we complement the group mean FMOLS results with
the estimates from the within-dimension panel DOLS (WDOLS) due to Kao and Chiang
(2000) and the between-dimension group mean panel DOLS (BDOLS) due to Pedroni
(2001). All estimators are asymptotically normally distributed16.
2.4 Panel Cointegration Regression Results and Dis-
cussion
In this section, we report and discuss the estimated long run results. The estimated long
run results from the FMOLS, WDOLS and BDOLS are summarised in Tables 2.2 -2.4
respectively.
The coefficient on EG enters positive and statistically significant in the panel WDOLS
estimates for all indicators of democracy and positive and statistically significant in the
panel FMOLS and BDOLS estimates when we consider PS and PR as indicators of
democracy. However, EG enters negative in the panel FMOLS and BDOLS estimates
when we consider PC as an indicator of democracy, but insignificant at any conventional
level. The results, clearly indicate that, the impact of EG on income in SSA countries
is positive (though marginal in magnitude). The coefficient on all democracy indicators
are negative and statistically significant for all estimators. The estimated results, clearly
indicate that, the impact of democracy (i.e. PS, PR and PC) on income in SSA coun-
tries is negative. Nonetheless, the impact of the interaction of economic globalisation and
16For more technical details on the panel FMOLS and the panel DOLS estimators, readers are referred
to (Pedroni, 2000, 2001) and (Kao and Chiang, 2000)
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Table 2.2: Panel FMOLS estimates
Models I II III
EG 0.003*** 0.002* -0.004
[3.712] [1.937] [-0.435]
PS -0.310***
[-4.911]
PR -0.446***
[-6.669]
PC -0.542***
[-7.399]
EG ∗ PS 0.007***
[3.918]
EG ∗ PR 0.015***
[8.209]
EG ∗ PC 0.019***
[9.392]
Note: Dependent variable logY . In parenthesis
are t-ratios. ***(*) denote rejection of the null
hypothesis at the 1%(10%) level
democracy is positive and statistically significant for all estimators and for all democ-
racy indicators. This interaction effect makes the total impact of economic globalisation
positive (although still marginal) whilst that of democracy still remains negative.
As a further robustness check we consider a general production function (Appendix
A.1.1) that incorporate economic globalisation, democracy and their interaction term as
additional explanatory variables to labour force and capital stock. The estimated results
based on panel FMOLS are presented in Appendix A.417. Generally speaking, the results
clearly indicate that the total impact of economic globalisation is positive and statistically
significant whilst that of democracy still remains negative and statistically significant.
Overall the result suggests that, whilst the total impact of economic globalisation on
income has been beneficial, the total impact of democracy has not been beneficial for
economic performance in SSA countries over the study period considered.
17Although we have stated that the impact of EG on income is generally positive and statistically
significant, this is not necessary the case for the FMOLS estimates of the production function model
(Appendix A1.1; Table A7). This indicates that, although economic globalisation (taken in isolation)
may be beneficial for the level of income, this is not necessarily the case for domestic output
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Table 2.3: Panel WDOLS estimates
Models I II III
EG 0.020*** 0.025*** 0.022***
[7.84] [9.86] [7.88]
PS -1.839***
[-12.40]
PR -0.894***
[-5.91]
PC -0.923***
[-4.88]
EG ∗ PS 0.041***
[10.33]
EG ∗ PR 0.027***
[6.60]
EG ∗ PC 0.030***
[6.10]
Note: Dependent variable logY . In parenthesis
are t-ratios. *** denote rejection of the null
hypothesis at the 1% level
Table 2.4: Panel BDOLS estimates
Models I II III
EG 0.003*** 0.004*** -0.001
[5.744] [6.282] [-1.117]
PS -0.247***
[-6.379]
PR -0.517***
[-11.86]
PC -0.745***
[-14.14]
EG ∗ PS 0.005***
[5.568]
EG ∗ PR 0.018***
[16.264]
EG ∗ PC 0.021***
[15.295]
Note: Dependent variable logY . In parenthesis
are t-ratios. *** denote rejection of the null
hypothesis at the 1% level
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The results of a negative impact of democracy on income is not surprising as the level
(and quality) of democracy in SSA countries over the study period is not only volatile, but
that it remains too low for its potential positive impact to be felt on income as predicted
by theory. In particular, the mean values of the democracy indicators of 0.3818, 0.3201
and 0.3419 (out of a maximum of 1) for PS, PR and PC are too low for their potential
benefits to be realised. Moreover, one could think of what has happened to the level of
income in Cote d’Ivoire, for example, between December 2010 and March 2011. This
phenomenon has also characterised many other SSA countries for decades. Overall the
result of the study indicates that, although the simultaneous adoption of both economic
globalisation and democracy is crucial, greater democratic advancement (see Fosu, 2008)
would be required for a better economic performance in SSA countries. Therefore, both
economic globalisation and democracy do matter for the level of income in SSA countries.
2.5 Conclusions and Policy Implications
This study has analysed the long run relationship between economic globalisation, democ-
racy and income for 31 SSA countries using panel cointegration techniques, over the 1980-
2005 period. A model that considered a composite indicator for economic globalisation
and several indicators of democracy was estimated. Different tests for unit roots and
cointegration for panels were considered. The panel unit roots test results show that all
series are stationary only after first differencing. The panel cointegration test establishes
long run cointegration relationship between economic globalisation, democracy and in-
come. The long run coefficients were estimated using several panel data estimators. The
empirical results, clearly indicate that, whilst the total long run impact of economic glob-
alisation on income has been beneficial, the total long run impact of democracy has been
the bane of income in SSA countries.
The empirical results reveals important policy implications. The panel estimates sug-
gest the essence of the simultaneous adoption of both economic globalisation and democ-
racy for SSA countries. This implies that the recent adoption of economic and political
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liberalisation policies in these countries are in the right direction so far as economic per-
formance is concerned. However, due to the negative impact of democracy on income,
policy reforms should aim to improve democratic institutions in SSA countries for its
potential benefits to be realised.
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Chapter 3
On the Implications of Trade
Openness, Foreign Aid and
Democracy for Wagner’s Law in
Developing Countries: Panel Data
Evidence from West African
Monetary Zone (WAMZ)
3.1 Introduction
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)1 - aiming at fostering
economic growth through harmonisation of macroeconomic policies - has been working
towards the adoption of a single currency by the year 2020 for decades. In 1994, for
1ECOWAS consist of 15 West African countries including Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote
d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra
Leone and Togo
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example, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)2 - which currently
share the same currency, CFA Franc, was created as the first Monetary Zone in the sub-
region. On December 15, 2000, five non-CFA ECOWAS countries, including The Gambia,
Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, initiated a second Monetary Zone in Bamako,
Mali. This led to the signing of the Accra Declaration on April 20, 2002, that launched
the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ)3 with the introduction of a single currency,
the ECO, which was initially scheduled to commence in January 2003. However, due to
member countries inability to meet all the necessary convergence criteria, the take-off has
been postponed several times, and although it is currently aimed at 2015, a determinate
commencement date for the ECO is yet to be decided4.
One of the sine qua non convergence criteria for WAMZ member countries is not only
the achievement of, but also the sustainability of fiscal discipline. Nonetheless, although
WAMZ countries committed themselves to reduce fiscal deficits to 4% of GDP by 2003,
this criteria is one that was missed by most member countries in 20105. Udoh (2011), for
example, note that fiscal deficits -usually financed through domestic and foreign borrow-
ing - contribute immensely to the high inflation dynamics in WAMZ countries. Moreover,
the lack of fiscal convergence and the fiscal behaviour of governments of WAMZ countries
remain the most critical constraint on the convergence programme of the proposed mone-
tary zone (Ojo, 2005; Debrun et al., 2005; Adam et al. 2010). Before the recent sovereign
debt crisis that characterises the European Monetary Union (EMU), the introduction of
the Euro in 1999 was seen as one of the greatest achievement of the EMU (De Grauwe,
2Eight ECOWAS member countries currently form WAEMU. These countries are Benin, Burkina
Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo
3The launch of WAMZ was to complement WAEMU so that the two Monetary Unions could be merged
into one Monetary Zone with a single currency for the sub-region by the year 2020. On February 16,
2010, Liberia become a member of WAMZ after signing the necessary membership agreement
4The commencement of the ECO was initially deferred to 2005, and then to 2009. Adam et al. (2010)
provide further justification for the recent postponement of the ECO to 2015. They note that inflation
rates shows high degree of divergence amongst WAMZ countries and that meeting the 2015 deadline
would require interventional policy measures
5The other primary convergence criteria for accession to WAMZ include the attainment of single digit
inflation, central bank financing of fiscal deficits not exceeding 10% of the previous year’s government
tax revenue and external reserves to cover at least 3 months of imports. The single inflation criteria was
also missed by most member countries in 2010
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2011). To enable WAMZ countries avoid similar debt crisis, ensure fiscal discipline, and
the sustainability of a single currency area, it becomes imperative that what matters for
government expenditure and revenue in these countries are well understood.
The present paper deals only with the first one and, in particular contributes to the
existing literature on Wagner’s law (Adolph Wagner, 1835-1917) and the recent discus-
sion on the need for fiscal discipline, fiscal policy coordination and innovative and efficient
ways of revenue generation in WAMZ countries (see Guillaume and Stasavage, 2000; De-
brun, 2000; Masson and Pattillo, 2003; Iyare et al., 2005, Debrun et al., 2005; Frimpong
and Oteng-Abayie, 2009; Udoh, 2011) in several respects. Firstly, it extends this line
of research by introducing the impact of trade openness, foreign aid and democracy on
government expenditure to determine whether Wagner’s law is fulfilled in these countries.
This is reasonable considering the importance that these policy variables have for the
overall size of government in developing countries in recent decades (See Rodrik, 1998;
Sobhee and Joysuree, 2004; Remmer, 2004; Mosley, 2005; Stasavage, 2005; Vergne, 2009;
Shonchoy, 2010). If this happens and government revenue cannot follow the same path
as its expenditure would imply large fiscal deficits and public debt accumulation. More-
over, because of moral hazard problems and the potential pressures that might persist
for a bail-out for countries with large fiscal deficits6 (in excess of the stipulated 4% of
GDP in the case of WAMZ), these countries inability to generate adequate domestic rev-
enues and/or meet the fiscal convergence criteria would imply that they are unlikely to
sustain a single currency. Secondly, many cross-country studies on the determinants of
government expenditure include in their sample both developed and developing coun-
tries7. However, cross-country studies on Wagner’s law that include both developed and
developing countries are inappropriate and may yield misleading results as it is more
likely that Wagner’s law will operate in countries at low levels of income (see Abizadeh
and Gray, 1985). This result is important as “the level and composition of government
expenditures for developing economies differ substantially from those of industrialised
6See for example, Chari and Kehoe (1998) and Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998, 2001)
7See for example, Ram, 1987; Rodrik, 1998; Benaroch and Pandey, 2008
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economies” (Lindauer, 1988). In this paper, we focus only on developing countries (in
this case WAMZ countries) where the need for fiscal discipline has become crucial, not
only for joining a monetary union, but most importantly to ensure the sustainability of a
single currency. Thirdly, we investigate the issue using panel data techniques (including
panel cointegration approaches) which allow us to address important econometric issues
- parameter heterogeneity, non-stationarity and potential endogeneity of regressors, serial
correlation problems and cross-section dependence - that have made most existing cross-
country panel studies on Wagner’s law unreliable. Last but not least, we highlight on the
country-specific results for all six WAMZ countries in addition to the panel estimates.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The literature on Wagner’s law and the
relationship between trade openness, foreign aid, democracy and government expenditure
are presented in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 discusses the empirical estimation methods. In
section 3.4, we present and discuss the empirical results. Section 3.5 provides a summary
of the main results of the paper and concludes with policy recommendations.
3.2 Literature Review
This section of the paper provides an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature
on the determinants of government expenditure with special reference to Wagner’s law and
the impact of trade openness, foreign aid and democracy on government expenditure. The
section is divided into three parts. In the first part we review the literature on Wagner’s
law. The second part considers the literature on the impact of trade openness, foreign aid
and democracy on government expenditure. The last part concludes the section.
3.2.1 Wagner’s Law
Wagner’s law - basically understood as the increment of the public sector along with
the economic development of a nation - has received extensive theoretical and empirical
investigation in developing countries8. The law offers valuable theoretical and empirical
8In this way, we would expect for nations in the process of economic development (as in many devel-
oping countries) that the share of government expenditure in real GDP expands with per capita income.
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explanation for a positive relationship between government expenditure and per capita
income9. For this reason, one would expect that “the greater the increment in economic
aﬄuence of a nation during a given period, the greater the expansion of the public econ-
omy” (Cameron, 1978). In other words, the common exogenous variable to explain the
expansion of the size of government is the national product (Mourao, 2007).
Many empirical studies have provided support for Wagner’s law in developing coun-
tries. For example, Abizadeh and Gray (1985) provide evidence for Wagner’s law for a
group of poor, developing and developed countries. They argued that the positive rela-
tionship between several measures of economic development and government expenditure
only hold for the developing group of countries. Ram (1987) provides further support for
Wagner’s law for about 60% of 115 countries investigated in an individual-country time
series study, but found no evidence for Wagner’s law from several cross-section results for
the 115 countries over the 1950-1980 period. Iyare and Lorde (2004) in a cointegration
and causality study of selected Caribbean countries found support for Wagner’s law for
a significant number of these countries. Akitoby et. al. (2006) in a cointegration and
error-correction model analysis using individual-country time series data from 1970-2002
for 51 developing countries found support for Wagner’s Law for about 70% of these coun-
tries. Torun and Arica (2011) employed panel cointegration techniques to test Wagner’s
law for a sample of 17 inflation targeting developing countries for the period 1995-2007,
and concluded in support of Wagner’s law for these countries.
However, the recent empirical results for Wagner’s law in WAMZ countries remain
mixed and inconclusive. For example, Olomola (2004) adopted cointegration techniques
to study Wagner’s law in Nigeria for the period 1970-2001, and found evidence in sup-
port of Wager’s law. Ghartey (2007), using Granger causality, autoregressive distributed
Nonetheless, this relationship could as well be negative as advocated by Wildavsky for low-growth coun-
tries (Wildavsky 1975, cited in Cameron, 1978)
9Shelton (2007) has shown that the argument in favour of Wagner’s law for developed countries (as
opposed to developing countries) are mostly “driven by demographic factors that rich countries are older
and spend more on social security”. However, total spending less social security actually declines with
income. In addition, there is the quest for politicians to satisfy the median voter and the need for
redistribution which tend to spur growth in government expenditure
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lag and the error correction model for the period 1965-2004, finds strong support for
Wagner’s law in Ghana. On the other hand, Babatunde (2008), Frimpong and Oteng-
Abayie (2009) and Oteng-Abayie (2011) find no support for Wagner’s law for a number of
WAMZ countries. For example, Babatunde (2008) employed the bounds testing approach
to cointegration (Pesaran et al., 2001) and the Granger non-causality test (Toda and Ya-
mamoto, 1995) to tests Wagner’s law for four WAMZ countries: The Gambia, Ghana,
Nigeria and Sierra Leone for the period 1970-2005, but find no evidence for Wagner’s law
for all four countries. Frimpong and Oteng-Abayie (2009) investigated Wagner’s law for
three WAMZ countries: The Gambia, Ghana and Nigeria. The time periods considered
were 1966-2004 for The Gambia, 1965-2003 for Ghana and 1965-2004 for Nigeria. Using
cointegration and Granger causality tests they find no support for Wagner’s law for all
three countries. Finally, Oteng-Abayie (2011) employed panel cointegration estimation
techniques to study Wagner’s law in five WAMZ countries - The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Nigeria and Sierra Leone for the period 1965-2007 - but found no evidence of long run
cointegration relationship for these countries (and hence no evidence for Wagner’s law).
Notwithstanding this, it is important to note that empirical tests for Wagner’s law for
developing countries discussed above solely involves bivariate analysis of different mea-
sures of both government expenditure and national income10. Nonetheless, as Sobhee and
Joysuree (2004) note, testing for Wagner’s law without controlling for trade openness,
for example, may lead to specification bias. Moreover, Shonchoy (2010) in a multivari-
ate panel data study of the determinants of government expenditure in 111 developing
countries over the 1984-2004 period found strong evidence in support of Wagner’s law.
The results further revealed significant positive impact of trade openness, foreign aid and
political institutions on the relative size of government expenditure in these countries.
Based on the empirical results discussed so far, it is reasonable to think that some
important determinants of government expenditure in WAMZ countries have not been
10For a comprehensive review and various formulation of Wagner’s law readers are referred to (Mann,
1980; Abizadeh and Gray, 1985; Henrekson, 1993; Peacock and Scott, 2000; Iyare and Lorde, 2004;
Ghartey, 2007)
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considered for the study of Wagner’s law. For this reason, we propose in this paper
that, the study of Wagner’s law in WAMZ countries should also take into considera-
tion the implications that the recent patterns of trade openness, foreign aid inflows and
democratisation have for government expenditure in these countries.
3.2.2 Trade Openness, Foreign Aid, Democracy and Govern-
ment Expenditure
The relationship between trade openness and government expenditure has been discussed
in line with two competing hypothesis: the efficiency hypothesis (or conventional wisdom)
and the compensation hypothesis11. The efficiency hypothesis argues that trade openness
is undermining governments’ sovereignty in the implementation and financing of domestic
policies beyond the provision of fundamental public goods. This proposition is further
elaborated by Wolf (2001) who argues that openness is limiting governments’ capacity to
function effectively, particularly in key areas of taxation, public expenditure for income
distribution and macroeconomic policy. Moreover, the competition associated with the
promotion of trade leads to a reduction in corporate and capital taxation that restrains
government expenditure patterns. This is the case as the competition associated with
trade openness “reduces governments’ abilities to provide goods and services to their
citizens” (Mosley, 2005) particularly in welfare state generosity programmes including
social transfers. The reason for this observation is that, because government expenditures
must be funded, his intervention in more open economies (through short-term borrowing
and higher taxes on income and wealth) are deemed wasteful and less effective as they
reduce a country’s competitiveness in the international market (Garrett, 2001). For these
reasons that trade openness could lead to a general decline in government expenditures
in more open economies.
On the other hand, the idea of a positive relationship between trade openness and
government expenditure, which is in line with the compensation hypothesis, was initially
11See Garrett (2001) for details on these two competing hypothesis
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proposed by Cameron (1978)12. Walter (2010) notes that, this hypothesis has two compo-
nents: a demand side where internationalisation increases voters demand for social insur-
ance and a supply side where generous welfare expenditure by government satisfies this
demand. In the words of Cameron (1978), countries more open to trade are characterised
by greater industrial concentration and strong unionised labour markets (through the for-
mation of employees association), which through collective bargaining are able to demand
more government expenditure in the form of social protection. However, Cameron’s col-
lective bargaining explanation for an expanding growth in government spending in OECD
countries may not necessarily apply to many developing countries (particularly WAMZ
countries) ”due to the relative weakness of organised labour in developing countries”
(Shelton, 2007).
In spite of this, Rodrik (1998), Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) and Alesina et al. (2005),
provide further support for this observed positive relationship between trade openness and
government expenditure. For example, in an influential paper, Rodrik (1998) documented
a positive and robust relationship between trade openness and government expenditure
for both low and high-income countries. Rodrik’s explanation (as against Cameron’s col-
lective bargaining explanation) was that “government spending plays a risk-reducing role
in economies exposed to a significant amount of external risk”. For developed (develop-
ing) economies with (without) the necessary administrative capacity such external risk,
which may include exchange rate, demand and supply fluctuations, is mitigated through
the provision of social insurance (public work) programmes (Shonchoy, 2010). Benarroch
and Pandey (2008) reconsidered the cross-sectional data of Rodrik (1998) using panel
data estimation techniques, including country specific fixed-effects13. Their conclusion
however, did not provide support for a positive link between trade openness and gov-
ernment expenditure as their Granger causality test show that higher lagged government
expenditure rather reduces trade openness. Moreover, although the empirical evidence
12Cameron (1978) in addition to this external explanation, also offers economic (as discussed under
Wagner’s law), fiscal, political and institutional structure explanations to government expenditure for
these countries
13They considered 96 countries for the 1970-2000 period
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confirm that more open developing countries faces external risk, the possibility of gov-
ernment expenditure playing a risk-reducing role may not necessarily apply when most
developing countries (particularly WAMZ countries) are considered. This is the case be-
cause as Wibbels and Ahlquist (2011) noted, government expenditure only provides social
insurance for internationally exposed sectors in OECD countries, and has no part in social
policies of developing countries. Moreover, although government expenditure grows with
trade openness in ECOWAS (and WAMZ) countries, there is no reason to believe that
government expenditure growth in these countries is the result of public insurance as ad-
vocated in Rodrik (Tirelli, 2010). For this reason, Rodrik’s hypothesis that the expansion
of expenditure could be explained by increases in trade openness might not necessarily
hold in WAMZ countries.
Along with trade openness is the impact of foreign aid on government expenditure14.
As noted by Edwards (1993), World Bank (1998) and Remmer (2004) developing coun-
tries’ ability to receive financial assistance from bilateral and multilateral institutions
routinely became conditional upon trade openness. The argument for foreign aid is that
it would help developing countries augment inadequate domestic revenue, saving and in-
vestment constraints, promote trade, and poverty reduction programmes, and improve
the efficiency of domestic institutions and governance. Nonetheless, because most of for-
eign aid channelled to these countries goes through the public sector, its impact depends
crucially on how it affects the behaviour of the receiving government (McGillivray and
Morrissey, 2000). For this reason, it is expected that a relationship exists between foreign
aid inflows and the expenditure patterns of aid receiving governments and critics, for ex-
ample, argue that it may increase public consumption rather than its intended purpose.
On the other hand, foreign aid inflows to developing countries is rather considered as
too volatile and for that matter should exert negative impact on government expendi-
ture. Due to the perceived volatility and/or fungibility of foreign aid (Feyzioglu, 1998;
Remmer, 2004; Hudson and Mosley, 2008) the argument for its impact on government ex-
14See for example (Heller, 1975; Boone, 1996; Feyzioglu, 1998; Remmer, 2004; and Hudson and Mosley,
2008)
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penditure in developing countries is one that has not been straightforward. In particular,
Hudson and Mosley (2008) note that, volatility of foreign aid reduces government expen-
diture, as it results in more volatile revenue inflows in developing countries. Moreover,
overdependence on foreign aid has the potential to reduce domestic revenue generation
(Remmer, 2004) and this effect combined with volatile foreign aid inflows should have
negative impact on government expenditure.
In spite of the potential negative impact of foreign aid inflows, government expendi-
tures in developing countries are often considered as driven by the availability of revenues,
regardless of the source. For this reason, that availability of foreign aid is often consid-
ered an important determinant of government expenditure in many developing countries.
Remmer (2004), for example, note that foreign aid has the potential of “systematically
generating incentives and opportunities for the expansion of government spending”. The
argument here is that government expenditure, in many less developed countries, has been
fuelled by foreign aid inflows from abroad (Heller, 1975) that increases the size of govern-
ment by promoting rent-seeking behaviour of the political elites (Boone, 1996). Moreover,
Ouattara (2006) argues that foreign aid although exert positive (negative) impact on de-
velopmental (non-developmental) government expenditure, does not in itself discourage
domestic revenue generation effort of aid receiving governments. For these reasons, and to
the extent that WAMZ countries continue to depend on foreign aid we hypothesise that
a positive relationship exist between foreign aid and government expenditure of these
countries.
The extent to which democratic institutions impact on government expenditure is well
emphasised in the literature (see Wildavsky, 1985; Boone, 1996; Adsera and Boix, 2002;
Knack, 2004; Stasavage, 2005; Mosley, 2005; Samiei and Jalilvand, 2011). As Wildavsky
(1985) and Mosley (2005) note, democratic institutions have the potential to influence
government consumption, government transfer payments, public employment and taxa-
tion. Moreover, ”domestic politics and institutions continue to be the most important
determinants of the overall size of government”, with the effect been more pronounced
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in advanced democracies (Mosley, 2005). Blais et al. (2010), for example note that, gov-
ernment expenditure generally expand as the number of parties in government (through
coalition government), cabinet officials, and parliamentary constituencies increase. Samiei
and Jalilvand (2011) in an empirical investigation of the impact of political participation
using several democracy indices for Asian and Pacific Ocean countries over the period
2000-2008, concluded that democracy increases government expenditure, although this
effect is small in magnitude.
It is important, however, to note that democracy may not only have a direct im-
pact on government expenditure (see, for example, Adsera and Boix, 2002; Plumper and
Martin, 2003; Hausken et al., 2004), but may also influence the extent to which both
trade openness and foreign aid impact on government expenditure. As Adsera and Boix
(2002) note, the working of the compensation and efficiency hypothesis, for example, are
both conditional on the level of democracy, with the compensation hypothesis been more
pronounced in both intermediate and advanced democracies. This result is important
as more democratic leaders may tend to spend more on public goods in order to attract
political support (see Plumper and Martin, 2003). Moreover, it is more likely that the
inflow of foreign aid may be more pronounced in developing countries more involved in the
democratisation process. This is the case as foreign aid may serve to support the electoral
process, in addition to strengthening the legislature and the judiciary (Knack, 2004). For
this reason, it is hypothesised that a positive relationship exist between democracy and
government expenditure.
3.2.3 Summary
The discussion above has provided an overview of the theoretical and empirical evidence
on Wagner’s law and the impact of trade openness, foreign aid and democracy on govern-
ment expenditure in developing countries. The discussion clearly indicates that studies
of Wagner’s law that do not consider the recent patterns of trade openness, foreign aid
inflows and democratisation in developing countries are likely to be biased. Moreover, al-
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though there has been some studies on Wagner’s law in WAMZ countries there is virtually
no evidence in the literature for all WAMZ countries that also considers the implications
of these variables for Wagner’s law. It is this empirical gap that this paper seeks to fill.
3.3 Empirical Methodology
3.3.1 Model Specification and The Data
The empirical analysis considers a model of the following specifications:
logGOVit = αi + δit+ β1logYit + eit (3.1)
logGOVit = αi + δit+ β1logYit + β2logOPENit + β3logAIDit + β4DEMit + eit (3.2)
where i = 1, 2, ..., N is the number of countries (N = 6), t = 1, 2, ..., T is the time series
dimension of the data (T = 29), GOV is the percentage share of government expenditures
in real GDP, Y is real per capita GDP (i.e. per capita income), OPEN is real openness,
AID is the percentage share of net Official Development Assistance (ODA) in real GDP,
and DEM is democracy, α1 is the country-specific fixed effects, δit is country-specific time
trends15, eit is the error term, β1 to β2 are parameters to be estimated. Data on ODA is
obtained from the World Bank (2010) - African Development Indicators 2010. Data on
DEM is obtained from Polity IV Project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009)16. The rest of the
data are obtained from the United Nations (2010) - United Nations Statistics Database
201017. Additional information on the data are presented in Appendix B.1.
3.3.2 Panel Cointegration Approach
The application of panel cointegration techniques means that the variables included in
equations (3.1) and (3.2) must exhibit unit root properties and being cointegrated. For
15The inclusion of country-specific fixed-effects and time trends allow us to capture any country-specific
omitted variables assumed to be stable in the long run
16We have used Polity2 which ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic). We
normalise the data such that it ranges from 0 (strongly autocratic) to 1 (strongly democratic)
17All real data are measured in constant 2005 US dollars
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this reason, and taken cognisance of the fact that our models are plagued by cross-section
dependence (see Appendix B.2), we rely on several panel unit root and panel cointegration
tests to treat this effect18. The panel unit root tests due to Breitung (2000) and Breitung
and Das (2005), Pesaran (2007) and Hadri (2000) are considered. The panel unit root
test results reported in Appendix B.3 show that all series can be treated as I(1).
To establish panel cointegration we rely on two panel cointegration tests: the residual-
based parametric panel t test statistic due to Pedroni (1999, 2004) and the standardised
panel LR-bar test statistic due to Larsson et al. (2001). According to Orsal (2008) these
two panel statistics have the best size and power properties (even in the presence of
correlated errors) in heterogeneous panels if T increases faster than the N dimension of
the panel. It is important to note that in implementing the two panel cointegration tests
we have taken into consideration the existence of cross-section dependence in our models.
The panel cointegration test results (Appendix B.4) suggest no evidence of cointegration
when we consider equation (3.1). In particular, there is not enough evidence to reject
the null hypothesis of no cointegration for all tests statistics. This result is consistent
with previous studies that do not support Wagner’s law in WAMZ countries as discussed
in section 3.2. However, both Pedroni (1999, 2004) and Larsson et al. (2001) panel
cointegration test statistics provide evidence of cointegration when we control for the
impact of trade openness, foreign aid and democracy. The panel cointegration test results
suggest that a long run cointegration relationship exists between government expenditure,
per capita income, trade openness, foreign aid and democracy in WAMZ countries.
We estimate the long run coefficient of equation (3.2) using the group mean panel
dynamic OLS (DOLS) estimator proposed in Pedroni (2001). The panel group mean
DOLS estimator which is based on the between dimension of the panel has a number of
advantages over other estimators (particularly those that are not based on the between-
dimension of the panel). In particular, the estimator suffers less from small sample size
18Readers are referred to (Breitung, 2005; Breitung and Das, 2005; Pesaran, 2007; Hadri, 2000; Pedroni,
1999, 2004; Larsson et al., 2001; Orsal, 2008) for additional details on these tests. To mitigate any impact
of cross-section dependence the test where appropriate is implemented on demeaned data as suggested
in Levin et al. (2002)
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distortions and appropriate in the presence of serial correlation and endogeneity of re-
gressors. Moreover, the estimator is robust in the presence of either homogeneous or
heterogeneous cointegration vectors and in the case of heterogeneous cointegration vec-
tors, the point estimates can easily be interpreted as the mean values of the cointegration
vectors (see Pedroni, 2001). In the presence of cross-section dependence, Pedroni (2001)
suggest the inclusion of common time dummies to mitigate this effect. Based on equation
(3.2) the Pedroni’s panel group mean DOLS estimates
logGOVit = αi + δit+ β1logYit + β2logOPENit + β3logAIDit + β4DEMit +
ki∑
j=−ki
γ1ij∆logYi,t−j +
ki∑
j=−ki
γ2ij∆logOPENi,t−j +
+
ki∑
j=−ki
γ3ij∆logAIDi,t−j +
ki∑
j=−ki
γ4ij∆logDEMi,t−j + eit
(3.3)
where γ1ij to γ4ij are the parameters of the augmented lag and lead differences, with
βˆ = N−1
∑N
i=1 βˆmi, tβˆm = N
− 1
2
∑N
i=1 tβˆmi and
ˆβmi being the parameter estimate of the
conventional time-series DOLS estimator for each member of the panel.
3.4 Empirical Results and Discussion
Table 3.1 presents the panel group mean DOLS results. As evident, the coefficient on per
capita income is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The results clearly
indicate that once trade openness, foreign aid and democracy have been catered for,
Wagner’s law becomes a reality for WAMZ countries. The coefficient on trade openness,
though positive is statistically insignificant at any conventional level. This means that
trade openness is not an important determinant of government expenditure in WAMZ
countries (based on the panel estimates). For this reason, neither the compensation nor
the efficiency hypothesis become important when these countries are considered.
However, not surprisingly, and considering the fact that foreign aid inflows to WAMZ
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Table 3.1: Panel group mean DOLS estimates
Models logY logOPEN logAID DEM
WAMZ 0.30*** 0.01 0.31*** 0.36***
[4.67] [0.09] [14.32] [3.88]
Note: Dependent variable logGOV . In parenthesis are t-
ratios. *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the
1% level.
countries average between 1-34% of real GDP, the coefficient on foreign aid is positive
and statistically significant at the 1% level. The results, clearly indicate that, government
expenditure in WAMZ countries strongly depends on foreign aid inflows. The coefficient
on democracy enters positive and statistically significant (i.e. at the 1% level). The result
indicates that recent democratic advances in WAMZ countries have been crucial for (and
also the most important determinant of) the overall size of the public sector.
3.4.1 Robustness Issues
To check the robustness of the panel group mean DOLS estimates in Table 3.1 we resort
to two alternative estimation approaches. In the first approach we use 5-year averages
for the 1980-2004 period (i.e. 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004)
and 4 year average for the 2005-2008 period of all variables. This transformation reduces
potential business cycle and non-stationarity effects that may be present in the annual
data (see Islam, 1995). Thus we split the data into six-time periods (i.e. T=6) for all six
WAMZ countries. Using the transformed dataset we estimate equation (3.2) by dynamic
OLS and IV(2SLS) that uses the Newey and West method to adjust the standard error as
well as a correction for any potential serial correlation and heteroskedasticity problems. In
estimating equation (3.2) by IV(2SLS) we use the transformed logY , logOPEN , logAID
and DEM lag one period ago. This allows us to also control for any potential endogeneity
problems as these may be expected. In column I and II (Table 3.2) we respectively report
the dynamic OLS and IV(2SLS) regression results with Newey-West adjusted standard
errors. In all cases, the results clearly confirms the panel group mean DOLS estimates
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Table 3.2: Dynamic OLS and IV(2SLS) estimates
Variables I II
logY 0.451*** 0.473*
[0.106] [0.245]
logOPEN 0.218 0.202
[0.209] [0.261]
logAID 0.484*** 0.509***
[0.045] [0.077]
DEM 0.558*** 1.081*
[0.191] [0.585]
Wu-Hausman test N/A 1.700
[0.1896]
Note: Dependent variable logGOV . *** and * denote
rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% and 10%
level respectively. In parenthesis of regression coef-
ficients are Newey-West heteroskedasticity and auto-
correlation consistent standard errors. In parenthesis
of Wu-Hausman test of exogeneity/validity of instru-
ments is robust p-value
with democracy remaining the most important determinant of the public sector in WAMZ
countries over the study period.
In the second approach we follow Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001) and Avelino
et al. (2005) and use the panel error correction model (PECM). Specifically, we estimate
equation (3.2) by Prais-Winsten regression using our original dataset (N=6 and T=29)
with panel-corrected standard error (PCSE) in the framework of Beck and Katz (1995)
in order to address econometric issues related to autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and
cross-section and/or spatial dependence. The estimated PECM result is summarised in
Table 3.3. The coefficients on lagged dependent and lagged independent variables are
correctly signed and consistent with the results reported in Table 3.1 and 3.219. In the
framework of Ericsson and MacKinnon (2002), a negative and statistically significant co-
efficient on the lagged dependent variable can be interpreted as evidence of cointegration.
19Within this framework the long run coefficients can be obtained by dividing the coefficients on the
respective lagged independent variables by negative the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable (i.e.
0.137) (see Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001; Ericsson and Mackinnon, 2002; Akitoby et al., 2006)
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Table 3.3: Panel Error Correction Model
Variables Coefficients
logGOV (-1) -0.137***[0.045]
logY (-1) 0.064*[0.039]
logOPEN(-1) 0.041[0.038]
logAID(-1) 0.053**[0.025]
DEM(-1) 0.122**[0.062]
∆Y 0.240**[0.102]
∆logOPEN -0.072[0.082]
∆logADI 0.096**[0.041]
∆DEM 0.080[0.152]
∆logGOV (-1) -0.117[0.113]
Note: Dependent variable ∆logGOV . Symbol ∆ is
the first-difference operator. Symbol ***, ** and *
denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level respectively. In parenthesis are panel-
corrected standard errors
We observe that the lagged dependent variable is negative and statistically significant
(i.e. at the 1% level). The result indicates that government expenditure, per capita in-
come, trade openness, foreign aid and democracy can indeed be considered a long run
relationship for WAMZ countries.
However, the result from the panel estimates does not necessarily mean that similar
conclusions can be drawn for individual WAMZ countries. For this reason, we present
in Table 3.4 the country-specific group mean estimates. As expected, the impact of per
capita income, trade openness, foreign aid and democracy varies across countries. With
the exception of Liberia where government expenditure and per capita income are not
significantly related, per capita income has statistically significant negative impact on
government expenditure in Guinea (consistent with Wildavsky’s hypothesis), but statis-
tically significant positive impact on government expenditure in all other countries. The
result implies that Wagner’s law has indeed happened in The Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria
and Sierra Leone. The coefficient on trade openness enters negative for The Gambia,
Ghana and Guinea, and positive for Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, but statistically
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insignificant for the case of Guinea and Liberia. The result implies that Rodrik’s hypoth-
esis is supported in Nigeria and Sierra Leone (but not all other WAMZ countries). We
also find statistically significant positive impact of foreign aid on government expenditure
in The Gambia, Ghana, Liberia and Nigeria, negative and statistically significant impact
in Guinea, but no relationship in Sierra Leone. Democracy is the only variable that sig-
nificantly explain government expenditure in all WAMZ countries. Democracy increases
government expenditure in The Gambia, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone whilst it re-
duces government expenditure in Ghana and Liberia. This results is not surprising given
the heterogeneity across countries in the indicators used (see Appendix B.1; Table B.1),
and confirms the use of group mean estimator in this study. Overall, the country-level
results reveals that per capita income, trade openness, foreign aid and democracy have
important implications for government expenditure in WAMZ countries, although their
magnitude and level of statistical significance varies across all six WAMZ countries.
Table 3.4: Panel group mean DOLS estimates (country-specific results)
Models logY logOPEN logAID DEM
The Gambia 2.96*** -0.49* 0.35** 0.94***
[5.55] [-1.66] [2.40] [4.46]
Ghana 3.30*** -1.46*** 1.09*** -1.92***
[5.65] [-4.72] [12.97] [-3.25]
Guinea -1.55*** -0.14 -0.17*** 0.76***
[-8.06] [-0.60] [-3.04] [3.19]
Liberia 0.03 0.08 0.26*** -0.86***
[0.53] [0.97] [14.72] [-4.43]
Nigeria 0.66*** 0.76* 0.53*** 0.38***
[3.50] [1.69] [7.58] [2.85]
Sierra Leone 1.06*** 1.24*** 0.09 2.17***
[4.29] [4.54] [0.45] [6.67]
Note: Dependent variable logGOV . In parenthesis are t-ratios. ***,
** and * denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and
10% level.
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3.5 Summary, Policy Implications and Conclusions
This study has analysed the implications of trade openness, foreign aid and democracy
for Wagner’s law in WAMZ countries. We have shown that no long run cointegration
relationship exists between government expenditure and per capita income (and hence no
support for Wagner’s law). However, we have emphasised that the study of Wagner’s law
in developing countries (and in particular WAMZ countries) should incorporate into the
analysis the potential impact of trade openness, foreign aid and democracy considering
the implications that these variables have for government expenditure. Therefore, once
we have controlled for the potential impact of these variables we find not only a long
run cointegration relationship between government expenditure, per capita income, trade
openness, foreign aid and democracy, but a relationship that also reveals that Wagner’s
law has indeed happened in WAMZ countries. Overall, the result reveals that, per capita
income, foreign aid and democracy have the potential to increase the size of the public
sector in WAMZ countries in the long run.
Based on these results, we believe that the immediate take-off of the ECO could induce
fiscal indiscipline as member countries’ willingness to ensure fiscal discipline is not guar-
anteed. Although, monetary union has the potential to provide an agency of restraint over
fiscal policies by preventing “public expenditure from outpacing public revenue” (Collier,
1991) - due in part because the influence of any single national authority is weakened in a
monetary union (De Grauwe, 1996) - and/or pave way for credible commitment to sound
macroeconomic policies (Guillaume and Stasavage, 2000; Beetsma and Bovenberg, 2001),
it may not be enough to ensure fiscal discipline in WAMZ countries. This will arise due
to the possibility for excessive public debt accumulation (Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1999;
2002) and the incentives available for governments to undertake suboptimal expansionary
macroeconomic policies, particularly during election years. This is important because,
as it is currently the case, not enough institutional structures have been put in place to
ensure innovative and efficient ways of domestic revenue generation to enable government
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revenue to keep pace with its expenditure. Udoh (2011), for example, note that gov-
ernment revenue generation still remain non-optimal in addressing fiscal deficit problems
in WAMZ countries. However, as Iyare et al. (2005) note, if government expenditure
expands but government revenue leads, then fiscal discipline will automatically follow.
With WAMZ countries still characterised by weak monetary (coupled with their inability
to satisfy the single digit inflation criteria) and fiscal institutions, it is recommended that
institutional structures on innovative and efficient ways of domestic revenue generation
are explicitly implemented in all WAMZ countries. These institutional structures if im-
plemented would not only help reduce over-dependence on foreign aid inflows, but should
also ensure fiscal policy coordination that would be necessary to complement what the
monetary union could potentially provide so far as fiscal discipline is concerned.
Accordingly, we conclude the study by reiterating that, if WAMZ countries are to
meet the fiscal convergence criteria and ensure the sustainability of a single currency area
(and to the extent that per capita income, foreign aid and democracy have the potential
to increase the size of the public sector in the long run), explicit sets of fiscal restraint on
the national authorities and innovative and efficient ways of domestic revenue generation
necessary to ensure that government revenue keep pace with its expenditure should be
what policy reforms should target.
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Chapter 4
On the Relationship between
Democracy, Government Spending,
and Economic Growth: The Case of
Ghana, 1960 - 2008
4.1 Introduction
Research on the impact of democracy and government spending on economic growth and
development has received a great deal of attention in the past few years. Nonetheless, the
extent to which these policy variables contribute to economic performance of developing
countries continues to be a subject of considerable and heated debate, as many countries
all over the world and sub-Saharan Africa in particular, have embarked on democrati-
sation of their political system1. Does democracy and government spending go hand in
hand to impact positive on economic performance of developing countries? This paper
sheds light on the hypothesis of high efficiency of government spending in democracies
1In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, while only two countries were considered free in 1972, this number
increased to 11 by 2008, though the number decreased to nine in 2010 (Freedom House, 2008; 2011). The
Freedom House (2011) report shows that 19% of countries in sub-Saharan Africa were rated as free, 45%
as partly free, and 35% as not free. Most of the gains did occur in the 1990s
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(see Plumper and Martin, 2003; Hausken et al., 2004), providing empirical evidence for
Ghana over the period 1960-2008. The Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) bounds
testing approach to cointegration proposed by Pesaran et al. (2001) is used for the estima-
tion. The findings of the study, especially a positive complementary impact of democracy
and government spending on economic growth could cement the democratic course the
countries in sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, have decided to pursue and to convince the
less democratic countries about the benefits of democracy in promoting economic growth
through government spending.
The increasing drive towards democratisation can be attributed to the many advan-
tages democratic institutions bestow upon a country. For example, democratic countries
are more likely to foster an environment conducive for long run growth and development -
as they are more prone to enhance the protection of property rights, promotes the rule of
law, economic freedom and stable politics, promotes a more efficient use of resources, and
an environment conducive for the inflows of foreign direct investment (Shen, 2002; Baum
and Lake, 2003). A functioning democracy helps to legitimise government actions by lim-
iting the power of the state to intervene arbitrarily in the economy thereby enhancing the
functioning of a market economy that allows for the most efficient allocation and use of
resources (Muller, 2007). Democracy helps to establish a more open political process that
makes government more beholden to voters as it promotes economic prosperity by min-
imising social cost from rent-seeking (see Wittman, 1995; Heckelman, 2009). No wonder,
ZackWilliams (2001) describes democracy as a sine qua non for economic development.
In spite of the potential benefits that democracy can have on economic growth of
countries optimists claim that democracy hinders economic growth because it reduces the
incentives for private investment. For instance, Hassett (2007) points out that there is
nothing theoretically compelling that suggests that democracy is a better form of gov-
ernment that reflects the underlying preferences of citizens. This claim is supported by
many recent studies that suggests that there is no systematic relation between democracy
and economic growth in general and that country conditions may be more important as
63
64
On the Relationship between Democracy, Government Spending, and Economic Growth:
The Case of Ghana, 1960 - 2008
determinants of economic growth (Acemoglu et al., 2005; Heo and Tan, 2001). Hence,
democracy would not always win (Hassett, 2007) as it would not necessarily outperform
other types of mechanisms for preference aggregation as a route to economic prosperity.
Sirowy and Inkles (1990), further note that, democratic regimes may have a negative
effect on economic growth because they are incapable of pervasive state involvement in
the development process in addition to their inability to implement the policies necessary
for long run economic growth. This is consistent with the view of Quinn and Whooley
(2001) that democratic politics impose costs or make economic adaptation more costly.
This could be attributed to the fact that high inequality in democracies lead to policies
that reallocate national income from investment to consumption, which slows economic
growth (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994).
The empirical results on the impact of democracy on economic growth remain mixed
and inconclusive as well. On the positive side, Grier and Munger (2006) investigated the
democracy - economic growth relationship for 134 countries covering the period 1950-2003
and reported that autocracies grow almost one percentage point slower than democracies.
Boko (2002) in a study of 27 African countries found that democracy has a significant
positive effect on economic growth. Notwithstanding this, Narayan, Narayan, and Smyth
(2011) in a study of 30 SSA countries between 1972 and 2001 found conflicting results for
the countries studied. They found a positive effect of democracy on economic growth for
Botswana, Madagascar, Rwanda, South Africa, and Swaziland, but a negative effect of
democracy on economic growth for Gabon and Sierra Leone. There are many other studies
which show that democracy may have a negative or at the most a non significant effect on
economic growth (Helliwell, 1994; Acemoglu et al., 2005; Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu,
2008; Aisen and Veiga, 2011). Helliwell (1994) investigated the effect of democracy for
125 countries over the period 1960-1985 and reported that democracy had a negative but
insignificant effect on economic growth. Aisen and Veiga (2011) reports in a study of 169
countries using GMM estimation techniques for the period 1960-2004 that democracy has
a slight negative effect on economic growth.
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About a decade ago, Minier (1998) argued that the many divergent and inconsistent
results of the democracy - economic growth relationship requires that attention be given to
country specific studies and its agenda with a focus on mechanisms and attendant contin-
gent events. Interestingly, other studies indicate that the effect of democracy on economic
growth is not uniform; specifically, that the effect of democracy may be different for the
developed and developing countries or may have regional effects (Narayan, Narayan, and
Smyth, 2011; Tiruneh, 2006; Aghion et al., 2007; Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu, 2008;
Krieckhaus, 2006; Heo and Tan, 2001; Kurzman et al., 2002).
On the other hand, the impact of government spending on economic growth is not
different as well. Not only is government spending important from the Keynesian per-
spective, especially during periods of economic recession, but the fact that government
can succeed or fail depending on whether its growth performance ranks high or low. In
endogenous growth models of (Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1990; Barro, 1990), for example,
government spending can stimulate short- and long-term growth (not only through in-
vestment in physical capital and labour), but most importantly through investment in
human and/or knowledge (technology) capital, innovations, technical development (in-
cluding communications and provision of public infrastructure), expenditure on health,
institutional quality and the protection of property rights.
Notwithstanding the theoretical support for government spending as a growth enhanc-
ing policy variable, the empirical evidence is one that still remain inconclusive on whether
government spending is on average crucial for economic growth in both developed and
developing countries. Many empirical studies that have investigated the relationship be-
tween government spending and economic growth find either negative or no effect (see,
for example, Barro, 1991; Al-Faris, 2002; Atrayee, 2009; Nketiah-Amponsah, 2009). In
an influential paper, Barro (1991) in a sample of 98 rich and poor countries found robust
evidence in support of an inverse relationship between government spending and economic
growth. In a time-series study of the United States over the period 1950-1998, Atrayee
(2009) found a significant negative impact of government spending on economic growth.
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The rational for this observed negative and/or no impact of government spending on eco-
nomic growth is that although government spending on its core functions may enhance
economic growth, there are good reasons to believe that, economic growth will be re-
tarded if government spending goes beyond its core functions into low or non-productive
activities2(Gwartney et al., 1998). For this reason, an efficient government should keep
its spending only up to the optimum of its core functions as “economies with large as well
as small public sectors may grow slowly” (Agell et al., 1997). This result is important not
only for developed economies, but most importantly for the developing world where gov-
ernment spending should be considered a priority for economic growth and development
if government is to succeed.
Per the discussion above, it is reasonable to think that certain mechanisms are needed
if democracy and/or government spending would impact positive on economic growth
and development. One of such mechanisms identified in Plumber and Martin (2003) and
Hausken et al. (2004) is the amount and quality of government spending that democrati-
sation world foster. They note that, an increase in democracy tends to divert the at-
tention of incumbent government from rent-seeking activities, and rather commit to the
provision of efficient and productive public spending (including the provision of public
goods) in order to attract political support. If this is the case, then one would expect
that although democracy and government spending may have negative and/or no effect
on economic growth individually - as the literature reviewed above may suggest-, their
interaction or complementary effects should be growth enhancing, particularly in coun-
tries involved in the democratisation process. This result is important because as many
studies have shown democracy does not have a direct effect on economic growth (see, for
example, Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu, 2008). Democracy, although may be associated
with larger government will not produce a detrimental net effect on economic growth as
it will keep government on focusing on its core functions. Therefore, with the growing
democratisation in the developing world, in particular, government spending could play
2Al-Faris (2002), for example, note that such low or non-productive government spending includes
expenditures on defense, subsidies, and socially and politically motivated recruitment in the public sector
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a significant role in influencing economic growth through the provision of efficient and
productive investments crucial for a better economic performance. Accordingly, and as
already emphasised, this study contributes to the literature by investigating, in a rigor-
ous systematic way, the extent to which democracy and government spending impact on
economic growth in Ghana.
The rest of the study is structured as follows. The next section discusses the empirical
strategy adopted for the study. The results are then presented and analysed, after which
we offer the implications of the study, and concluding remarks.
4.2 Empirical Strategy
Several cointegration approaches are available in the literature to establish a long run re-
lationship between cointegrated variables. In the framework of Engle and Granger (1987),
Johansen and Juselius (1990), Gregory and Hansen (1996) among others, if two variables
are integrated of order one (i.e. I(1)) and the associated error term is integrated of order
zero (i.e. I(0)), then the two variables are said to be cointegrated. Nonetheless, the re-
quirement of strictly I(1) variables are often difficult to be met in empirical applications.
Moreover, these approaches are particularly appropriate for large samples, which is not
the case in this study. For this reason, we propose the ARDL bounds testing approach
to cointegration and the error correction model (ecm) to determine the extent to which
democracy and government spending impact on economic growth in Ghana in both the
long - and the short-run over the period 1960-2008. The ARDL approach to cointegration
is not only robust in the present of cointegration and potentially endogenous regressors,
but it is particularly appropriate for small sample study and provided the underlying
variables are not integrated of order two (i.e. I(2)) or even more yields valid results ir-
respective of whether the variables considered are purely I(1), I(0), or a combination of
both (see Pesaran et al., 2001).
To define a long run relationship between two variables Y and X, the ARDL approach
involves first estimating the conditional error correction model (ecm) of the following
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specification:
∆Yt = α0 +
p∑
i=1
α1∆Yt−i +
p∑
i=0
αm∆Xt−i + δ1Yt−1 + δmXt−1 + eit (4.1)
where Y is the dependent variable, X is the vector of the observations of included explana-
tory variables, ∆ is the first difference operator, m is the number of regressors, and e is the
error term. Following earlier researches we analyse the role of democracy and government
spending on economic growth in Ghana in the framework of an augmented production
function. For this reason, we define Y as the logarithm of real GDP (logY ) and X to
include the logarithm of the labour force (logLAB), capital stock (KAP ), democracy
(DEM), government spending (GOV ), an interaction term for democracy and govern-
ment spending (DEM ∗GOV ), democracy squared (DEMSQ), trade openness (OPEN)
and financial development (FD). We include DEM ∗ GOV and DEMSQ in equation
(4.1) to capture any interaction and/or non-linear effect that may exist between democ-
racy, government spending, and economic growth (see Barro 1996; Plumper and Martin,
2003).
The second step test the null hypothesis of no cointegration by restricting the coeffi-
cients of the lagged level variables equal to zero (i.e. H0: δ1=δm=0 against the alternative
hypothesis that H0: δ1=δm 6=0) using an F-test by estimating equation (4.1) by OLS. The
asymptotic distribution of the F-statistic follow a non-standard distribution under the null
hypothesis of no cointegration and are computed by stochastic simulation irrespective of
whether the variables are purely I(0), I(1), or a combination of both. Microfit 5.0 provide
two sets of asymptotic critical value bounds. The lower and upper critical values assume
that all variables are I(0) and I(1) respectively. If the computed F-statistic exceeds the
upper critical values, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected, if below the lower
critical values, then we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. However, the
test is inconclusive if the calculated F-statistic falls within the two critical value bounds.
Following the existence of cointegration, the final step estimates the long - and short-
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run coefficients of the selected ARDL model. In selecting the optimal lag structure (p)
for the ARDL model in equation (4.1) we use the Schwartz Information Criterion (SIC)
as this provides more parsimonious model specification, particularly in small samples (see
Pesaran and Pesaran, 2009).
4.2.1 The Data
The data for real GDP is obtained from the World Bank (2010) - African Develop-
ment Indicators 2010. Data for democracy is based on Polity2 score3 obtained from
Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009). Government spending is measured as
the share of government spending in GDP based on data obtained from World Bank
(2010) - African Development Indicators 2010. The labour force and capital stock (which
we proxy by the share of gross fixed capital in GDP) variables are based on data ob-
tained from the World Bank (2004, 2010) - World Development Indicators 2004 and
2010. The trade openness variable is measured based on the trade share in GDP (i.e.
(EXPORTS+IMPORTS)/GDP ) and the data is obtained from World Bank (2010) -
African Development Indicators 2010. Data for financial development (which we proxy
by the share of credit to the private sector in GDP) is obtained from the World Bank
(2010) - African Development Indicators 2010.
4.3 Empirical Findings and Discussion
In this section we present and discuss the empirical results on the relationship between
democracy, government spending, and economic growth in Ghana, 1960-2008. We begin
the presentation of empirical results and discussion with the time series properties of the
data and the ARDL based cointegration test. We then follow it up with the long run and
short-run estimates and the associated diagnostic and stability tests.
3This score combine various measures of the political system of countries. It ranges from -10 (strongly
autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic). To allow us control for any potential non-linear effects we have
rescaled the data to range from 0 (strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly democratic)
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4.3.1 Unit Root and Cointegration Test Results
Since the validity of the ARDL approach to cointegration relies on either I(0), I(1) or
a combination of both, it is important that we first determine the time series properties
of individual series that enter equation (4.1). This will allow us to be sure that all
included variables are not I(2) or even more. We consider two alternative unit root
testing procedures: the non-parametric Phillips-Perron (PP) test proposed by Phillip
and Perron (1988) and the Zivot-Andrews (Zandrews) test due to Zivot and Andrews
(1992) that takes into consideration the impact of structural break endogenously. The
null hypothesis that the series have unit roots is tested against the alternative hypothesis
that the series have no unit root for the PP test. On the other hand, the Zandrews
test - which allows for one structural break in the series that may appear in the intercept,
trend or both, and determined endogenously - test the null hypothesis that the series have
unit roots without structural break, against the alternative hypothesis that the series are
stationary with a structural break at an unknown break date. The PP and Zandrews unit
roots test results are reported in Tables 4.1 and 4.24 respectively.
Table 4.1: Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root test results
Level First difference
Variable Trend No Trend Trend No Trend
logY -0.344 1.711 -5.148*** -4.788***
DEM -2.713 -1.524 -5.569*** -5.635***
GOV -2.421 -2.432 -5.920*** -5.984***
DEM ∗GOV -2.430 -1.338 -5.682*** -5.727***
DEMSQ -2.356 -1.187 -5.855*** -5.885***
logLAB -1.118 -0.996 -5.611*** -5.617***
KAP -2.679 -1.651 -7.780*** -7.607***
OPEN -2.083 -1.201 -5.949*** -5.930***
FD -0.971 -0.538 -7.956*** -7.746***
Note: *** indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root at the
1% level.
4These tests have been implemented using the PP and Zandrews routine in STATA. The associated
break date for the intercept, trend and both for Zandrews test in Table 4.2 are respectively reported in
column 5 under Break dates
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Table 4.2: Zivot-Andrews (Zandrews) unit root test results
Variable Trend No Trend Both Break Dates
logY -3.384 -3.599 -4.212 1979; 1984; 1981
DEM -4.598** -5.814*** -5.857*** 1981; 1990; 1981
GOV -3.145 -3.274 -3.357 1978; 1993; 1981
DEM ∗GOV -4.293 -5.386** -5.626*** 1981; 1990; 1981
DEMSQ -4.928** -5.217** -5.457** 1981; 1994; 1981
logLAB -2.516 -4.016 -2.940 2003; 1999; 2003
KAP -2.532 -3.243 -2.789 1993; 1979; 1978
OPEN -2.203 -2.923 -2.363 1993; 1978; 1976
FD -3.923 -3.691 -3.753 1973; 1985; 1987
Note: ***(**) indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root at
the 1%(5%) level.
The results from the PP test reveals that all the variables are stationary only after first
differencing (i.e. I(1)). The results are independent of whether we allow for deterministic
trend or not. On the other hand, the Zandrews test results support the presence of unit
root without structural break in all variables, except DEM , DEM ∗GOV and DEMSQ,
as the null hypothesis of unit root without structural break is not rejected. The Zandrews
test reveals that DEM , DEM∗GOV and DEMSQ can be treated as stationary variables,
but with structural break. The PP and Zandrews test results confirm that all included
variables in equation (4.1) can be treated as either I(0) or I(1). This justifies the rational
for the adoption of ARDL bounds testing approach to cointegration in this study.
We present in Table 4.3 the results for the computed F-statistics5. In model I we
report the results for equation (4.1). We drop OPEN in model II, DEMSQ in model
III and OPEN and DEMSQ in model IV as both variables are insignificant at any con-
ventional level6. The ARDL (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2), ARDL (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2), ARDL
(1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2), ARDL (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2) are selected for model I, II, III and IV
5We have computed the results summarised in Tables 4.3 - 4.6 using Microfit 5.0
6We have also estimated these models with other economic growth determinants for which data were
available including inflation, foreign aid and terms of trade among others but all these variables were
insignificant at any conventional level. Unfortunately, we could not find time series data on human capital
for the period considered. However, this is not a limitation considering the fact that all estimated models
are cointegrated which rules out the omitted variable problem
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respectively by SIC. As evident, the F-statistic for all estimated models are significant
at the 5% level. Therefore, we conclude based on this results that all estimated ARDL
models are cointegrated. This means that a long run cointegration relationship exists
between democracy, government spending, and economic growth in Ghana over the study
period considered.
Table 4.3: ARDL bounds test for cointegration relationship
Models I II III IV
Test Statistics 3.937** 4.161** 4.324** 4.729**
Note: ** indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegra-
tion at the 5% significance level. The 95% lower and upper critical
value bounds reported with the ARDL model I, II, III and IV are
2.515-3.904, 2.627-4.049, 2.627-4.049 and 2.739-4.051 respectively
4.3.2 Estimated Regression Results
In what follows we report the estimated long run (Table 4.4) and short-run (Table 4.5)
results. Beginning with the variables of interest, the coefficient on DEM is negative and
significant in both the long run and the short-run. This finding is not surprising because
as noted by Aghion et al. (2007) democracy is conducive to economic growth in more
advanced sectors of the economy. They report that democracy does not matter or may
even have a negative effect on economic growth in sectors far away from the technological
frontier. In an earlier study of South Africa and Ghana over the period 1960-1998, Guseh
and Oritsejafor (2007) reported that democracy had a positive effect in South Africa but
a negligible or even a negative effect in Ghana. This finding gives support to the view
that democracy, by itself is unlikely to promote economic growth (Acemoglu, 2009). In
poor developing countries for example, Stasavage (2005) note that, the formal adoption
of democracy, in isolation, will have no effect on policy (and hence economic growth)
because of the absence of strong institutions.
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Table 4.4: Estimated long run coefficients using the ARDL approach
Variable I II III IV
DEM -0.080** -0.084*** -0.076** -0.081***
(0.036) (0.026) (0.034) (0.025)
GOV -0.126 -0.131 -0.138 -0.146*
(0.099) (0.093) (0.094) (0.085)
DEM ∗GOV 0.769** 0.797*** 0.789** 0.830***
(0.294) (0.222) (0.293) (0.210)
DEMSQ 0.007 0.008
(0.020) (0.020)
logLAB 0.753*** 0.749*** 0.752*** 0.745***
(0.059) (0.049) (0.059) (0.049)
KAP 0.076* 0.071** 0.079* 0.073**
(0.043) (0.026) (0.042) (0.026)
OPEN -0.002 -0.003
(0.016) (0.016)
FD 0.298*** 0.292*** 0.308*** 0.300***
(0.064) (0.047) (0.058) (0.043)
INTERCEPT 1.333** 1.380** 1.345** 1.415***
(0.559) (0.457) (0.563) (0.454)
Note: Dependent variable logY . In parenthesis are standard er-
rors. ***(**)[*] indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the
1%(5%)[10%] level
The most surprising result is that of the squared term of democracy (DEMSQ).
Barro (1996) argued that for countries at low level of political freedom for example,
more democracy could enhance growth. This result is further stressed by Fosu (2008)
in a panel of 30 sub-Saharan African countries for the period 1970-2004, that increasing
electoral competition in these countries would be growth enhancing. Unlike Barro (1996)
and Fosu (2008) the coefficient on DEMSQ though enters positive is not significant in
both the long run and the short-run and therefore provides no evidence for a non-linear
relationship between democracy and economic growth in Ghana for the study period
considered. However, this result does not necessarily mean that increasing democracy
would not be growth enhancing, but that its true impact depends also on country-level
conditions. It is important also to note that the period 1960-2008 considered for the study
is characterised by not just a smooth transition from autocracy to democracy, but by a
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series of political instability and dictatorship for most parts. This may explain to some
extend the non-significant coefficient on the squared democracy term. With the increasing
political democracy in Ghana in recent years, it is hoped this effect will be significant as
well.
The coefficient on GOV enters negative in all estimated models in both the long run
and the short-run, and statistically significant at the 10% level for model IV (although
it has no explanatory power in models I, II and III). This negative and/or no impact
of government spending on economic growth is not surprising, as it is consistent with
previous studies on Ghana. For example, while the study of Ansari et al. (1997) and
Ghartey (2007) for the periods 1963-1988 and 1965-2004 respectively have concluded that
government spending did not play any crucial role in influencing economic growth and
development in Ghana, the study of Nketiah-Amponsah (2009) and Sakyi (2011) for the
periods 1970-2004 and 1984-2007 respectively concludes that government spending has
been the bane of economic growth and development in the country. This result indicates
that government spending by itself have no effect or even a detrimental effect on economic
growth.
Notwithstanding this, the coefficient on the interaction term for democracy and gov-
ernment spending (DEM ∗GOV ) is positive and statistically significant in both the long
run and the short-run. This means that not only is the impact of the interaction effect
positive but also that the total impact of government spending (democracy) remains posi-
tive as well. This result supports the hypothesis of high efficiency of government spending
in democracies (see Plumber and Martin, 2003; Hausken et al., 2004) and the findings of
Baum and Lake (2003) that democracy has an indirect effect on economic growth through
government spending. Glaeser et al. (2004), for example, note that this indirect effect
of democracy can be seen through its effect on increased government spending on educa-
tion and health conducive for long run growth. In a related study of African countries,
Stasavage (2005) reported that many African governments spend a lot more on education
when they become democratic. Thus, in expanding its size, democratic institutions help
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Table 4.5: Error Correction Representation for the selected ARDL Models
Variable I II III IV
∆DEM -0.038** -0.040** -0.035** -0.037***
(0.017) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012)
∆GOV -0.060 -0.062 -0.064 -0.067*
(0.045) (0.042) (0.042) (0.039)
∆(DEM ∗GOV ) 0.366** 0.377*** 0.367*** 0.384***
(0.130) (0.103) (0.128) (0.100)
∆DEMSQ 0.003 0.004
(0.010) (0.010)
∆logLAB 0.358*** 0.354*** 0.350*** 0.343***
(0.075) (0.069) (0.071) (0.062)
∆KAP 0.036* 0.033** 0.037* 0.034**
(0.021) (0.012) (0.020) (0.011)
∆OPEN -0.001 -0.002
(0.008) (0.007)
∆FD 0.012 0.010 0.013 0.010
(0.034) (0.031) (0.033) (0.031)
∆FD(-1) -0.111*** -0.110*** -0.112*** -0.111***
(0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032)
ect(-1) -0.475*** -0.473*** -0.466*** -0.461***
(0.088) (0.084) (0.082) (0.078)
F − Statistic 5.494*** 6.272*** 6.244*** 7.205***
R− bar2 0.489 0.502 0.501 0.514
DW − Statistic 1.900 1.901 1.879 1.879
Note: Dependent variable ∆logY . In parenthesis are standard er-
rors. ***(**)[*] indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the
1%(5%)[10%] level
government to extend its horizons and consequently promote long term policies conducive
to a better economic performance (Aisen and Veiga, 2011).
Consistent with neoclassical growth theory both the labour force and capital variables
enter with the correct sign (positive) and statistically significant in both the long run and
the short-run, and for all estimated models. Consistent with many other studies (Aisne
and Veiga, 2011: Gries et al., 2009), the trade openness variable is not significantly related
to economic growth over the study period. A tentative explanation for this result is that
the period before 1983 was characterised by a trade policy regime that was inappropriate
and inadequate (see Sakyi, 2011). Although many studies indicate that the relationship
75
76
On the Relationship between Democracy, Government Spending, and Economic Growth:
The Case of Ghana, 1960 - 2008
between financial depth and economic growth is not robust but that it depends on how
financial depth is measured we find in this study that for Ghana, the financial depth
(share of credit to the private sector in GDP) variable is positive but only significant
in the long run, which suggests that financial deepening can play a facilitative role in
promoting economic growth, although this effect will be delayed (as it has no positive
effect in the short-run). This result implies that the government of Ghana has to focus on
promoting policies conducive for financial deepening, particularly in the banking sector
of the economy.
Table 4.6: Model Diagnostics and stability test for selected ARDL models
Diagnostic/Stability Test I II III IV
Serial Correlation 0.3 ∗ 10−5 0.9 ∗ 10−6 0.004 0.005
(0.999) (1.000) (0.952) (0.945)
Functional Form 0.8 ∗ 10−3 0.002 0.088 0.097
(0.977) (0.966) (0.767) [0.755]
Normality 1.476 1.501 1.342 1.359
(0.478) (0.472) (0.511) (0.507)
Heteroskedasticity 0.741 0.691 0.834 0.764
(0.389) (0.406) (0.361) (0.382)
CUSUM Stable Stable Stable Stable
CUSUMQ Stable Stable Stable Stable
Note: Probability values in parenthesis
Notwithstanding the discussion above, it is important to note that the adequacy and
reliability of ARDL models crucially depends on their statistical properties as well (see
Hendry et al., 1984). For this reason, we report a series of diagnostic and stability tests
(see Table 4.6). The diagnostic and stability test reveals the statistical adequacy of the
estimated ARDL models. In particular, all estimated ARDL models passes the test of
functional form and normality of residuals and there is no evidence of serial correlation,
heteroskedasticity, model misspecification, non-normality of residuals and coefficient in-
stability. The results are not “spurious” given that all estimated models are cointegrated.
Moreover, the coefficient on lagged error correction term (ect(−1)) is negative, reasonably
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high in absolute value and highly significant (at the 1% level). The ect(-1) result reveals
a moderately high speed of long run equilibrium adjustment every year after a short-run
shock. This confirms further the cointegration test results.
4.4 Policy Implications and Conclusions
This study has analysed the impact of democracy and government spending on economic
growth in Ghana for the period 1960-2008. The findings of the study suggests that
democracy and government spending, by themselves do not exert a positive long - and
short-run effect on economic growth. However, as predicted by theory, the interaction
of democracy and government spending led to a significant positive long - and short-
run effect on economic growth. The labour force and capital variables were significantly
related to economic growth, while trade openness did not in both the long-and short-run.
Financial development variable had a positive long run effect on economic growth, but
this effect was not captured in the short-run. The findings of the study and the literature
reviewed provide important policy recommendations.
As this study has revealed, democracy by itself is unlikely to promote economic growth
and development in Ghana. The rapid drive towards democratisation without productive
government spending and other complementing reforms such as economic liberalisation,
rule of law, macroeconomic stability, and regulatory reform will not succeed. Indeed,
Barro (1996) observed that an African country in which democracy gets far ahead of
economic development is unlikely to be sustainable. The way forward then is to promote
overall institutional development. Obviously, this must be done with the focus on build-
ing human capital spearheaded by the government through investment in education and
health conducive for long-term growth and economic development. This could potentially
be achieved with further improvement in political institutions, in particular. As the de-
bate rages on with respect to the relationship between democracy, government spending,
and economic growth in developing countries, it may be easier or even wiser also to further
promote fundamental reforms in terms of the free markets and the importance of securing
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private property rights (Hernandez-Murillo and Martinek, 2008), which is consistent with
recent progress as witnessed in the Asian economies. In this sense, efforts at promot-
ing trade and financial development and attracting foreign direct investment should be a
priority for the government of Ghana as well.
It is important to note that, the findings of the study are limited by the fact that a
broad concept of democracy was used. Other studies suggest that different components of
democracy might have different effects and that some components may be more important
than others (Heckelman, 2010). Consequently, further research could examine this in
detail. Another key issue is to identify which type of democracy (regime type) is more
growth enhancing, for example parliamentary versus presidential as noted by Persson
(2005), Acemoglu (2009) and Pereira and Teles (2009). Finally, future research should
seek to examine in detail other channels or indirect effects of democracy on economic
growth as this study and others seem to suggest.
Altogether, the study has shown that to transform the policy environment to promote
the welfare of the citizenry, democratic reforms are crucial if government spending must
lead poor countries on to the growth trajectory necessary to promote long term growth and
development. Looking ahead, political, economic and governance reforms must reinforce
each other in order to promote the growth needed to reduce poverty in Ghana.
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Chapter 5
Trade Openness, Growth and
Development: Evidence from
Heterogeneous Panel Cointegration
Analysis for Middle-Income
Countries
5.1 Introduction
According to economic analysis, one of the most important benefits associated to trade
openness is the achievement of a faster and less volatile process of economic growth and
development (Winters, 2004). For the developing countries to catch up with the more
advanced ones, a higher and more sustained economic growth is required in the former
(Mobarak, 2005). This implies that these countries require a huge amount of resources,
which, to a certain extent, have to be acquired from advanced economies. The need for
developing countries to get these resources led to their over-reliance on foreign aid, grants
and loans. Nonetheless, the quantum, quality and timing of overseas aid, grants and loans
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are often not only dependent upon economic conditions of developing countries but also on
conditions rich countries impose on them; in particular, on the high servicing charges and
repayment obligations such aid, grants and loans carry with them. This is where trade
arises as an alternative to enable these countries to obtain the needed resources. Trade
openness has been considered as one of the main policies expected to allow developing
countries to alter both the pace, pattern and structure of their participation in the inter-
national market scene, thereby overcoming balance-of-payments problems, accelerating
technical progress and hence promoting economic growth and development. In sum, it is
considered that openness to trade helps to improve economic performance by increasing
competition and by giving domestic firms access to the best foreign technology, which is
very helpful to raise domestic productivity, and to better finance.
Nonetheless, although trade openness has became an important policy variable for
developing countries for the last few decades, its impact on economic growth and de-
velopment has recently received a great deal of attention from academic researchers and
policy makers alike, as many developing countries continue to embark on the liberalisation
of their trading system and signing bilateral, regional and multilateral trade agreements
with other countries all over the world. In spite of this phenomenal policy change, the
precise effect of trade openness on economic growth and development, at least for devel-
oping countries, still remains an open question as both theoretical and empirical studies
have not yet provided a definitive conclusion (see, for example, Lopez, 2005).
Many theoretical models have been proposed to explain how trade openness may, or
may not, have a positive impact on economic growth and development (see Grossman
and Helpman, 1990, 1991; Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991; Young, 1991; Romer, 1993;
Mountford, 1998; Spilimbergo, 2000; Ben-David and Loewy, 1998, 2000, 2003; Perera-
Tallo, 2003).
For many empirical studies, on the other hand, the strengh of the impact of trade
openness on economic growth and development is often dependent on the econometric
techniques used - time series, cross-section, or panel data -, how both economic growth
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and development and trade openness are measured1, the treatment of potential endogene-
ity of trade openness (Sachs and Wagner, 1995; Harrisson, 1996; Srinivasan and Bhag-
wati, 1999; Dollar and Kraay, 2004; Rodriquez and Rodrik, 2001), the time period and
the country samples under consideration. For example, Srinivasan and Bhagwati (1999)
have criticised cross-sectional regression methodology for reasons of their inappropriate-
ness and weak theoretical foundations. This methodology and other homogeneous panel
data methods often do not take into consideration potential cross-country heterogeneity.
Moreover, the problem of cross-section dependence that arises from unobserved common
factors or shocks is often not addressed. For these reasons, cross-sectional regression and
homogeneous panel data methods, when employed in cross-country economic growth and
development studies that often tend to exhibit high degree of cross-country heterogeneity
and cross-section dependence may produce potentially biased and inconsistent estimates
(see Pesaran and Smith, 1995; Lee et al., 1997; Pesaran, 2006; Phillips and Sul, 2003;
Pedroni, 2007; Costantini and Destefanis, 2009).
Bearing these considerations in mind, the main contribution of this paper to the
existing literature lies in taking advantage of the recent development in non-stationary
heterogeneous panel data techniques to examine the impact of trade openness on economic
growth and development for a sample of 85 middle-income countries over the period
1970-2009; the idea is to determine whether these countries have benefited in terms of
economic performance from international trade openness or otherwise. In addition, we go
a step further to highlight on the result related to 20 middle-income sub-Saharan African
countries included in our sample. Specifically, we employ the Common Correlated Effects
Mean Group (CCEMG) estimator developed by Pesaran (2006) and applied by Holly
et al. (2010) and Cavalcanti et al. (2011). We further check the robustness of our
results with the Group Mean estimators developed by Pedroni (2000; 2001) - the Fully
Modified Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS) and the Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares
1In most recent studies the level of development is proxied by the level of per capita income (see
Frankel and Romer, 1999, Irwin and Tervio, 2002; Dollar and Kraay, 2003; Freund and Bolaky, 2008)
while economic growth is proxied by the rate of income growth (see Chang et al., 2009; Kim and Lin,
2009; Kim, 2011)
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(DOLS). By using these estimators we are able to address econometric issues related to
non-stationarity, parameter heterogeneity, endogeneity, omitted variable bias and cross-
section dependence, with the implication that our conclusions are more robust than those
in previous papers.
The rest of the study is organised as follows. In section 2 we review the theoretical and
empirical literature on the impact of trade openness on economic growth and development.
Section 3 explains the empirical methodology. Section 4 discusses the empirical results.
In the final and last section of the study we offer our concluding remarks.
5.2 Literature Review
Theoretical economic growth and development models - extended standard neoclassical
exogenous, and endogenous economic growth and development models (see, for example,
Grossman and Helpman, 1990, 1991; Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991; Spilimbergo, 2000;
Ben-David and Loewy, 1998, 2000, 2003 and Perera-Tallo, 2003) - suggest that trade
openness may contribute to economic growth and development by fostering technological
progress and international and domestic competition. Although quite general, these theo-
ries sometimes differentiated between which group of countries - developed or developing
- benefits the most from trade openness.
Ben-David and Loewy (1998, 2000, 2003), for example, provide an extension of the
standard neoclassical exogenous growth model to incorporate multi-country, open econ-
omy endogenous growth features. In these models economic growth depends on the rate of
knowledge accumulation - which is facilitated through trade liberalisation policies. Focus-
ing on the steady-state economic growth impact of trade openness, the authors show that
all countries benefit positively from both unilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation.
Ben-David and Loewy (1998), for example note that more open economies face competi-
tive pressures, and for firms in these economies to compete with foreign firms they need to
incorporate foreign knowledge into their production processes. This is possibly achieved if
countries liberalise foreign trade as it facilitates the diffusion of knowledge. Moreover, in
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endogenous growth models (see for example, Grossman and Helpman, 1990, 1991; Romer,
1993), trade openness fosters the flow of knowledge and ideas between countries. Spilim-
bergo (2000) developed a Ricardian model of international trade with non-homothethic
preferences and showed that a developing country liberalising its trade with a developed
country can benefit more in terms of welfare gains. Therefore trade openness connects
developing countries, in particular, to more advanced countries not only to acquire foreign
exchange through exports, but most importantly through the access to intermediate and
high-tech goods through imports, which facilitate the diffusion of knowledge and technol-
ogy (see. Feder, 1982; Grossman and Helpman, 1990, 1991; Rodrik, 1999; Almeida and
Fernandes, 2008).
Notwithstanding the theoretical support for trade openness as an economic growth and
development enhancing policy variable, it must be admitted that trade openness can also
potentially be detrimental to economic growth and development in the developing world
through various channels. For example, as noted by Grossman and Helpman (1990, 1991),
economic growth and development will be hampered if trade openness leads a country to
specialise in sectors with comparative disadvantage in R&D activities. This is likely to be
the case for countries at very low levels of development, due to human capital constraints
and their inability to take advantage of international technology transfer (Kim, 2011). In
addition, although in the context of an endogenous growth model, Perera-Tallo (2003) has
shown that the level of income determines the degree of trade openness, so there are good
reasons to believe that the degree of trade openness and the level of income are positively
related as well, implying the possibility for long-run causality. Perera-Tallo (2003) however
notes that, although trade openness may affect the level of income positively, it may not
necessarily be robustly related to economic growth (and this effect may even be negative).
The reason for this is that as trade openness increases over time - due to the expansion
of the market base that leads to an increase in the level of income - the rate of income
growth may decrease due to the fact that the economy converges towards a steady-state.
This potential no effect or even negative income growth effect of trade openness is
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in line with the endogenous growth model proposed by Young (1991). He notes that,
under free trade, developing (developed) countries may experience income growth less
than or equal (greater than or equal) to those experienced under autarky. Yet another
important explanation for this potential low income growth effect of trade openness for
developing countries - as compared to the developed countries - may be that there is an
income level (or level of development) below which more trade openness has detrimental
consequences for economic growth (see, for example, Kim and Lin, 2009; Kim, 2011).
Therefore, although trade openness may have a positive affect on the level of income, it
may not necessarily have a positive growth effect for developing countries.
Leaving aside theoretical reasoning, it is also important to note that the empirical evi-
dence on the impact of trade openness on economic growth and development is also mixed
and inconclusive. Several empirical studies support a positive impact of trade openness on
economic growth and development. Harrison (1996) used alternative openness measures
to investigate the relationship between trade openness and economic growth for devel-
oping countries for the periods 1960-1987 and 1978-1988. For most openness measures
Harrison concluded that more trade openness is associated with higher economic growth.
Frankel and Romer (1999), in an attempt to control for potential endogeneity of trade
openness, used geographical components of trade to construct a measure for trade open-
ness. Their results revealed that trade openness has a positive effect on income levels,
although this effect is moderately statistically significant. Wacziarg (2001) studied the
relationship between trade openness and economic growth for a panel of 57 countries over
the period 1970-1989 and concluded that trade openness has a positive and significant
impact on economic growth. Vamvakidis (2002) studied the same relationship using his-
torical data for the period 1870-1990, and concluded that the positive openness-growth
link is rather a recent phenomenon, mostly driven by the unprecedented expansion in
world trade which began in the 1970s. While no significant positive relationship was
found for periods before 1970, the period 1970-1990 showed a significant positive effect of
trade openness on economic growth. Irwin and Tervio (2002) used data for the pre-World
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War I, the interwar and the post-war periods to investigate the effect of trade openness
on income, concluding that, even after controlling for endogeneity problem, trade open-
ness affect levels of income positively. Brunner (2003) used a dynamic panel data model
to study the impact of trade openness on the level of income and income growth for a
sample of 125 countries for the period 1960-1992, and concluded that trade openness has
a significant large effect on the level of income, but small and non-robust effect on in-
come growth. Lee et al. (2004) investigated the relationship between trade openness and
economic growth for a sample of 100 countries for the period 1961-2000. Using identifica-
tion through heteroskedasticity to address potential endogeneity of trade openness, they
concluded that trade openness has indeed increased economic growth for these countries,
although this effect is small in magnitude. Salinas and Aksoy (2006) employed multivari-
ate fixed effects estimations to assess the impact of trade openness on economic growth
over pre- and post trade liberalisation periods and concluded that, the post-liberalisation
period saw an increase in economic growth of about 1.2 percentage points higher than
the pre-liberalisation period. Rassakh (2007) used the empirical model of Frankel and
Romer for a sample of 150 countries to investigate the impact of trade openness on levels
of income and the rate of income growth, and concluded that trade openness benefits the
developing countries (i.e. low-income countries) more than the developed ones. Freund
and Bolaky (2008) studied the relationship between trade openness and levels of income
for a sample of 126 countries and found this effect to be positive, but only for well regu-
lated economies. Chang et al (2009) investigated the effect of trade openness on economic
growth for 82 countries (that included 22 developed and 60 developing countries) for the
period 1960-2000, and concluded that, generally speaking, trade openness is positively
related to economic growth. The study further revealed that this association can be en-
hanced significantly, particularly for developing countries, if trade reforms are combined
with labour market flexibility, human capital formation, inflation stabilisation, financial
development, public infrastructure and governance reforms. More recently, the study by
Villaverde and Maza (2011) conducted for a sample of 101 countries and the period 1970-
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Table 5.1: Summary Evidence on Trade Openness effects on Growth and Development
Source Country Period Results Methodology
Wacziarg (2001) 57 1970-1989 (+) effect on growth Panel data
Vamvakidis (2002) 89 1870-1970 no effect on growth OLS
1970-1990 (+) effect on growth
Brunner (2003) 125 1960-1992 (+) large effect on Panel data
income
(+) small non-robust
effect on growth
Lee at al. (2004) 100 1961-2000 (+) effect on growth Panel data
Salinas & Aksoy (2006) 39 1970-2004 (+) effect on growth Panel data
Rassakh (2007) 150 1960-1985 (+) effect on Panel data
income & growth
Freund & Bolaky (2008) 126 2000-2005 (+) effect on income OLS
Chang et al. (2009) 82 1960-2000 (+) effect on growth Panel data
Kim (2011) 61 1960-2000 (+) effect on growth OLS
depends on level
of development
Note: For most authors we show only the maximum number of countries considered
2005 also show that economic globalisation (for which trade openness is one of the main
indicators) has conducted to a higher economic growth and, simultaneously, to worldwide
income convergence.
On the contrary, there are also some empirical papers casting doubts about the re-
lationship between trade openness, growth and development. In fact, recent empirical
investigations by Dowrick and Golley (2004), Kim and Lin (2009) and Kim (2011) have
shown that trade openness benefits rich countries more than poor countries due to poor
countries inability to take advantage of knowledge accumulation and technology spillovers.
This is also the case because as Kali et al. (2007) noted, not only does the volume of
trade matters, but also the structure of international trade has significant implications for
economic growth and development. They emphasised that the number of trading part-
ners that a country is able to benefit from is crucial for the impact of trade openness on
economic growth and development, and that less developed countries stand to lose from
this advantage. In addition, what a country actually exports (i.e. either capital inten-
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sive, manufactured or primary products), for example, matters as well for its potential
benefiting from international trade. These arguments imply that not all countries take
advantage from trade openness, and that the level of development already attained by a
country as well as the the structure of its international trade critically determine if trade
openness impacts positively on economic growth and development.
As can be seen, there is a vast literature on the topic of the relationship between
trade openness, growth and development. Then, to conclude this section with an attempt
to offer a snapshot of the current state of knowledge on this issue, Table 5.1 reports a
summary of the main papers devoted to it from 2000 onwards.
5.3 Methodology
5.3.1 Model Specification and The Data
Although both theoretical and empirical literature revised in the previous section is not
conclusive, the existence of a long-run relationship between trade openness and develop-
ment is mostly accepted except maybe in some cases when the development degree of the
country under study is quite low. This being so, to investigate the long-run impact of
trade openness on development, we follow the literature on panel cointegration analysis
and first consider an empirical model with the following specification:
logYit = αi + βilogOPENit + eit, i = 1, 2, ...N, t = 1, 2, ...T (5.1)
where Yit is real per capita income of country i in year t, OPENit denotes trade openness,
log is the logarithm operator, αi is the country-specific fixed effects, eit is the error term,
and βi the country parameters related to trade openness. An important feature of our
model is that we do not impose a common coefficient among all the countries under
analysis. As mentioned in the introduction of the paper, the parameter β is allowed to
be heterogeneous between countries. This being so, we are interested in the average value
of βi, namely β. In other words, and following the methodology proposed by Pesaran
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(2006), β=N−1
∑N
i=1 βi is the parameter of interest to be estimated, reflecting the long-
run relationship between trade openness and per capita income.
Regarding the short-run dynamics and their adjustment to the long-run, they are
accommodated through the error term, which has a multi-factor error structure (eit=w
′
ift+
uit). The specification of the error term, as well as Pesaran’s proposal, are throughly
explained below when it comes to dealing with estimation issues.
To estimate Eq. (5.1) we have used a balanced panel data consisting of 85 middle-
income countries for the period 1970-2009. Out of these, 20 are from Sub-Saharan Africa.
Annual data on trade openness and real per capita income are obtained from Penn World
Tables Version 7.0 (Heston et al., 2011). Although the World Bank classifies 110 countries
as middle-income economies2, the data is available for only 85 of these countries for the
period considered. It is important to note that the trade share in GDP (i.e. Exports
+ Import/GDP ) is the most commonly used proxy for trade openness as the trade
performance of countries capture the most important dimension of openness in general.
However, we define trade openness in real terms (i.e. trade openness based on constant
2005 PPP dollars). In like manner, real per capita income is measured based on constant
2005 PPP dollars. The list of countries considered are presented in Appendix C.1.
5.3.2 Econometric Issues
To obtained consistent estimates for Eq. (5.1) we need to address several econometric
issues that arise. Firstly, as noted in the introduction, an important issue of cross-section
dependence - that results from unobserved common shocks or factors - needs to be taken
into consideration. If there is a problem of cross-section dependence and it is not prop-
erly accounted, the estimated β and its associated standard error will be biased and
inconsistent (see Driscoll and Kraay, 1998; De Hoyos and Sarafidis, 2006, Costantini and
Destefanis, 2009, Holly et al., 2010). For this reason, we first determine whether the error
2We have combined the countries in the upper-middle-income and lower-middle-income
groups (see World Bank (2011) - Classification of economies July 2011. < http :
//data.worldbank.org/about/country − classifications/country − and− lending − groups >
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term eit in Eq. (5.1) and the OLS residuals from ADF (p) regressions of the logYit and
logOPENit across all the 85 countries in the panel over the period 1970-2009 are not
plagued by cross-section dependence. The cross-section dependence (CD) test (Appendix
C.2) clearly indicate that the logYit and logOPENit, as well as the error term eit in Eq.
(5.1), are plagued by cross-section dependence. Secondly, by the application of panel
cointegration techniques to establish a long-run relationship in Eq. (5.1), we are assum-
ing that both logYit and logOPENit are integrated of order one, or I(1) stationary, and
cointegrated. The existence of cointegration between logYit and logOPENit means that
the error term, eit is stationary or I(0), implying that Eq. (5.1) is also not plagued by the
omitted variable problem (see Herzer, 2010; Cavalcanti et al., 2011). For these reasons,
if these conditions are satisfied inference based on the long-run relationship in Eq. (5.1)
would not be spurious, and the short-run dynamics, and their adjustment to equilibrium
in the long-run across countries can easily be captured, as we mentioned in the model
specification, through the error term, eit (see Holly et al., 2010). To determine whether
the variables in Eq. (5.1) exhibit unit root properties and are cointegrated, and taken into
consideration the problem of cross-section dependence, we make use of panel unit root
and cointegration tests that treat this effect. The panel unit root (Appendix C.3) and
cointegration (Appendix C.4) tests show that all variables exhibit unit root properties
and are cointegrated3.
5.4 Empirical Results and Discussion
We have established in the previous section that the variables in Eq. (5.1) exhibit unit
root properties and are cointegrated. This section, devoted to the empirical results and
discussion, begins with the long-run panel estimates. We then follow it up with the
robustness of the results and conclude the section with causality issues. The causality
analysis will not only allow us to capture the long-run direction of causality between trade
3For presentation purpose we do not report the results related to the 20 middle-income Sub-Saharan
African countries, since similar conclusions are drawn in all cases, but are available upon request
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openness and levels of income (levels of development), but most importantly, the short-
run (growth) effects.
5.4.1 Estimation of Long-run Relationship
As we indicate before, we estimate the long-run relationship in Eq. (5.1) using the common
correlated effects mean group (CCEMG) estimator proposed by Pesaran (2006). The
CCEMG estimator, which augment the OLS regression in Eq. (5.1) with the cross-
sectional averages of the dependent variable (logYt) and the regressor (logOPENt), has
been shown as the way to properly eliminate both strong and weak common factors in
large cross-sectionally dependent panel data models, and is consistent even when the
associated errors are weakly cross-sectionally dependent (see Pesaran, 2006; Holly et al.,
2010; Pesaran and Tosetti, 2011). In the application of the CCEMG estimator, Pesaran
(2006) assume that the error term eit follow a multi-factor structure defined by
eit = w
′
ift + uit (5.2)
where ft, which is allowed to be stationary or nonstationary (see. Kapetanios et al., 2011)
and also allowed to be serially correlated and possibly correlated with logOPENit (see.
Holly et al., 2010; Cavalcanti et al., 2011), is a vector of unobserved common shocks,
while the individual-specific error term uit is assumed to be distributed independently of
ft and logOPENit and allowed to be weekly dependent across i and serially correlated
over t. The CCEMG estimator is based on OLS regression of the following specification
logYit = αi + βilogOPENit + βi0logYt + βi1logOPENt + eit (5.3)
where the included cross-sectional averages (logYt ) and (logOPENt) only serve as prox-
ies for the common factors and may not have any interpretable meaning (see Pesaran,
2006). The coefficient of interest is computed as the simple average of the N countries (i.e.
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βˆ=N−1
∑N
i=1 βˆi). To enable comparison of the results, we also compute the traditional
mean group (MG) estimates of Eq. (5.1), which does not take account of cross-section
dependence by assuming independent errors. Aside the results we present for all the
85 middle-income, we also present the results for the 20 Sub-Saharan African countries
included in our sample. In this way, we also determine whether the the middle-income
countries from this region has also benefited from international trade openness or not.
The estimated MG and CCEMG results are reported in Table 5.24.
Table 5.2: Estimated Long-run MG and CCEMG results
Estimator MG CCEMG
85 Middle-Income Countries
logOPENit 0.317*** 0.091**
(0.098) (0.042)
CD test statistics 79.90*** -1.28
20 Sub-Saharan Africa Middle-Income Countries
logOPENit 0.476* 0.235**
(0.266) (0.102)
CD test statistics 11.18*** -1.06
Note: Dependent variable logYit. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Symbol
***(**)[*] denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%(5%)[10%] significance level.
The CD test statistics are Pesaran (2004) CD test on the residuals of MG and CCEMG
estimates
As evident, the long-run relationship between trade openness and the level of income is
positive and highly significant in both estimators (at least at the 5% level). However, we
observe, on the one hand, that the mean coefficient β is much bigger in the MG estimate
than in the CCEMG and, on the other, that the MG estimate is biased given the high
degree of cross-section dependence unveiled by the CD test statistic. These results reveal
that neglecting the impact of cross-section dependence can bias upwards the coefficient
of the estimated long-run relationship; the difference between estimates, furthermore, is
significant enough to assert that researchers should not overlook this issue, as has been
4XTMG routine in STATA was used to implement the MG and CCEMG results while XTCD routine
in STATA was used for the CD statistics
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common practice so far. In addition, the CCEMG estimator has led to a significant re-
duction of cross-section dependence inherent in Eq. (5.1) and thus provides us with the
true mean coefficient β.
5.4.2 Robustness Issues
To check the robustness of Pesaran’s CCEMG results presented in Table 5.2, we use the
group mean Fully Modified OLS (FMOLS) and the group mean Dynamic OLS (DOLS)
proposed by Pedroni, where the impact of cross-section dependence is captured through
common time effects (Pedroni, 2000, 2001). According to Pedroni (2001), these two es-
timators - which are based on the between dimension of the panel - are promising in
estimating the true mean value of β in Eq. (5.1) in heterogeneous cointegrated panels.
This author suggests that, by using FMOLS and DOLS estimators, a consistent and effi-
cient estimation of cointegration vector is achieved, in particular where non-stationarity,
endogeneity of regressors and serial correlation problems are suspected.
The FMOLS estimator considers the following cointegrated system
logYit = αi + βilogOPENit + eit, (5.4)
logOPENit = αi + βilogOPENi,t−1 + vit (5.5)
where zit=(eit, vit)’ is I(0) with a long-run asymptotic covariance matrix Ωi, and logYit
and logOPENit are assumed I(1) and being cointegrated. Pedroni (2000), following
the Phillips and Hansen (1990) time series approach (but in this case allowing for het-
erogeneity in the fixed effects and the short-run dynamics), makes a semi-parametric
correction to the OLS estimator to account for potential endogeneity and other econo-
metric problems inherent in Eq. (5.1). The group mean FMOLS estimator for β com-
pute βˆ = N−1
∑N
i=1
(∑T
t=1 xit − x¯i)2
)−1(∑T
t=1 xit − x¯i)
)
Y ∗it − Tτi, where yit=logYit,
xit=logOPENit, τˆi ≡ Γˆ21i + Ωˆo21i- Lˆ21iLˆ22i (Γˆ22i − Ω
o
22i), y
∗
it = (yit − y¯i)- Lˆ21iLˆ22i∆xit, Lˆi denote
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lower triangular decomposition of Ωˆi.
On the other hand, Pedroni’s DOLS is based on the estimation of the following equa-
tion
logYit = αi + βilogOPENit +
k∑
j=−k
λij∆logOPENi,t−j + eit (5.6)
where λij denote the coefficients of the augmented lag and lead differences, which account
for any potential endogeneity and serial correlation problems. The estimated β is com-
puted as the simple average of the long-run DOLS estimates for each N in the panel (i.e.
βˆ=N−1
∑N
i=1 βˆi).
Table 5.3: Estimated Long-run FMOLS results
Raw data Demeaned data
85 Middle-Income Countries
logOPENit 0.318*** 0.078**
(0.013) (0.011)
20 Sub-Saharan Africa Middle-Income Countries
logOPENit 0.581*** 0.138***
(0.070) (0.032)
Note: Dependent variable logYit. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Symbol
*** denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level
The estimated long-run results using group mean FMOLS and DOLS (implemented
using Pedroni’s procedure available in RATS) with and without the inclusion of common
time effects are reported in Table 5.3 and 5.4 respectively. Consistent with the MG and
CCEMG results (Table 5.2), we observe a positive and significant relationship between
trade openness and the level of income in all cases. In addition, the mean coefficient β
is bigger for both estimators if we use the raw data that do not account for cross-section
dependence. However, the estimated β is much small and comparable to the CCEMG re-
sult in estimates with common time effects. The result clearly shows that although trade
93
94
Trade Openness, Growth and Development: Evidence from Heterogeneous Panel
Cointegration Analysis for Middle-Income Countries
Table 5.4: Estimated Long-run DOLS results
Raw data Demeaned data
85 Middle-Income Countries
logOPENit 0.266*** 0.084***
(0.010) (0.010)
20 Sub-Saharan Africa Middle-Income Countries
logOPENit 0.629*** 0.173***
(0.079) (0.040)
Note: Dependent variable logYit. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Symbol
*** denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level
openness has significant positive impact on the level of income, this effect is much smaller
once econometric issues are well addressed. More importantly, middle-income countries
in SSA have benefited even more from trade openness as our results indicate.
5.4.3 Causality, Short-run Dynamics and Adjustment to the
Long-run
Our panel results have pointed out that, as expected, a positive long-run relationship
between trade openness and the level of income exists. Another important issue is to
determine the short- and long-run causal relationship between the two variables and, in
particular, whether trade openness has economic growth (or income growth) effect as well.
To deal with this issue, we estimate a panel error correction model given by
∆logYit = c1i +
p∑
j=1
γ11j∆logYi,t−j +
p∑
j=1
γ12j∆logOPENi,t−j + k1ecti,t−1 (5.7)
∆logOPENit = c2i +
p∑
j=1
γ21j∆logYi,t−j +
p∑
j=1
γ22j∆logOPENi,t−j + k2ecti,t−1 (5.8)
where ∆ is the first-difference operator, ∆logYit is the rate of economic growth, ecti,t−1 is
the lagged error correction term computed from the long-run cointegrating relationship
of Eq. (5.1), in which ectit=logYit-αˆi-βˆilogOPENit. We first determine whether the coef-
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ficients on the lagged error correction terms are different from zero (i.e. k1 6=0 and k1 6=0).
If this was not the case for at least one of them, we would not be able to rely on the
panel cointegration results which establish a long-run cointegrating relationship between
trade openness and the level of income, and hence there would not be any evidence for
long-run Granger causality. On the contrary, if at least one of the adjustment coefficients
was non-zero, we would be able to determine the direction of long-run Granger causal-
ity by implementing a χ2-test for the null hypothesis of long-run Granger non-causality
on the coefficients on ecti,t−1. Secondly, we determine whether there is any evidence of
short-run Granger causality by implementing a χ2-test for the null hypothesis of short-
run Granger non-causality on the lags of the short-run coefficients (γ). To implement the
short- and long-run Granger causality we estimate Eqs. (5.7) and (5.8) by the CCEMG
which account for cross-section dependence. The results are reported in Table 5.5. Based
on the CCEMG results, it can be seen that the adjustment coefficient is negative and
highly significant (at the 1% level) in all cases, indicating that the long-run cointegrating
relationship between trade openness and the level of income truly holds. The rejection of
the χ2-test for the null hypothesis of long-run Granger non-causality on the coefficients of
ecti,t−1 indicates a long-run bi-directional Granger causality between trade openness and
the level of income. Nonetheless, there is not enough evidence to reject the null hypoth-
esis of short-run Granger non-causality between trade openness and economic growth in
both directions. Summing up, we are thus able to conclude that, although the hypothesis
of short-run non-causality cannot be rejected, the long-run causality for middle-income
countries is bi-directional, suggesting that trade openness is both a cause and a conse-
quence of development, that is, higher development degrees (and associated productivity
gains) encourage firms to explore external market opportunities.
5.5 Concluding Remarks
This study has investigated the impact of trade openness on economic growth and devel-
opment of 85 middle-income economies over the period 1970-2009. In order to do so, it has
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Table 5.5: Causality tests - CCEMG results
85 Middle-Income Countries
logYit logOPENit
Coefficient on ecti,t−1 -0.266*** -0.444***
χ2(1) 202.11*** 300.25***
∆logYi,t−1[χ2(1)] 2.40
∆logOPENi,t−1[χ2(1)] 1.59
20 Sub-Saharan Africa Middle-Income Countries
Coefficient on ecti,t−1 -0.263*** -0.407***
χ2(1) 74.71*** 84.59***
∆logYi,t−1[χ2(1)] 0.39
∆logOPENi,t−1[χ2(1)] 0.21
Note: Symbol *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level
made use of several heterogeneous panel cointegration techniques that are robust in the
presence of non-stationarity, endogeneity and cross-section dependence and which offer
more reliable results than conventional approaches. The main conclusions of the study are
that there is a significant long-run relationship between trade openness and development,
and that this is bi-directional, this implying that higher development tends to increase
trade openness and vice-versa. The existence of a short-run interaction between these two
variables is not, however, supported by our empirical investigation. This conclusions are
consistent also for the 20 middle-income sub-Saharan African countries included in the
sample. The short-run results is on a priori basis quite surprising, but it is convenient
to note that it is in line with the theoretical model by Perera-Tallo (2003). A tentative
explanation of this result is that the effect of trade openness will lead to a reallocation of
resources, in favour of economic activities in which developing countries are more compet-
itive, only in the medium/long-run. Accordingly, and although in the short-run policies
devoted to foster openness can not have the desired effects, these prove to be very fruitful
in the long-run and, therefore, they should be implemented by developing countries.
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A.1 Model Specification and The Data
A.1.1 Augmented Production Function Model
To further check the robustness of the empirical results we estimate the impact of eco-
nomic globalisation and democracy on income using alternative model specification. For
this reason, we define m (see equation (2.1)) by considering a general production func-
tion that incorporate economic globalisation, democracy and their interaction term as
additional explanatory variables to labour force and capital stock. Therefore, based on
equation (2.1) the following specific equation is estimated:
logY ∗it = αi + β1logLit + β2Kit + β3EGit + β4DMit + β5(EG ∗DM)it + eit (A.1)
where Y ∗it is real GDP, Lit is labour force, Kit is the capital stock (which we proxy by the
share of gross fixed capital in real GDP), EGit, DMit, (EG ∗DM)it, log, αi and eit are
as previously defined and β1 to β5 are the parameters to be estimated with β3 to β5 the
parameters of interest.
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A.1.2 Data Definition and Sources
Y : Real GDP per capita; World Bank (2010) - African Development Indicators (2010)
Y ∗: Real GDP; World Bank (2010) - African Development Indicators (2010)
L: Labour Force; World Bank (2010) - African Development Indicators (2010)
K: Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP); United Nations (2010)
PS: Polity2; Marshall and Jaggers (2009)
PR/PC: Heritage Foundation; Freedom House (2006)
EG: Economic Globalisation; KOF Index of Globalisation (2010)
Table A.1: Components of KOF’s economic globalisation index
Indices and Variables Weights
i) Actual F lows (50%)
Trade (% of GDP) 19%
Foreign Direct Investment, Flows (% of GDP) 22%
Foreign Direct Investment, Stock (% of GDP) 24%
Portfolio Investment (% of GDP) 17%
Income Payments to Foreign Nationals (% of GDP) 20%
ii) Restrictions (50%)
Hidden Import Barriers 22%
Mean Tariff Rate 28%
Taxes on International Trade (% of current revenue) 27%
Capital Account Restrictions 22%
Source: KOF’s Index of Globalisation (2010)
A.2 Cross-section Dependence in Panel Data Models
To compute the three statistics we estimate equation (2.2) and/or (A.1) and then compute
the following:
i) Frees’ statistic compute
R2 =
2
N(N − 1)
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
rˆ2ij (A.2)
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ii) Friedman’s statistic compute
R =
2
N(N − 1)
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
rˆij (A.3)
where rˆij is the estimate of spearman’s rank correlation coefficient rij = rji =∑T
i=1
(
rit−(T+ 12 )
)(
rjt−(T+ 12 )
)
∑T
i=1
(
rit−(T+ 12 )
)2 of the residuals
iii) Pesaran’s statistic compute
CD =
√
2T
N(N − 1)
(
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
ρˆij
)
(A.4)
where ρˆij is the estimate of ρij. The null hypothesis tests ρij = ρji = corr(eij, eji) = 0
for i6=j versus the alternative hypothesis that ρij = ρji 6=0 for some i 6=j where ρij = ρji =∑T
i=1 eitejt(∑T
i=1 eˆ
2
it
) 1
2
(∑T
i=1 eˆ
2
jt
) 1
2
. The test results are reported in Tables A.2 and A.3.
Table A.2: Tests for cross-section dependence (equation 2.2)
Test statistics I II III
Frees 9.281*** 9.230*** 9.607***
Friedman 35.908 46.683** 46.683**
Pesaran 1.790* 3.751*** 3.716***
ABS 0.512 0.521 0.540
Note: ABS is the average absolute value of the off-
diagonal elements of the residuals. Critical values
from Frees’ Q distribution are 0.1870, 0.1297 and
0.0996 for the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level re-
spectively. ***(**)(*) denote statistical significance
at the 1%(5%)(10%) level
99
100 Appendix of Chapter 2
The results suggest that there is enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis of cross-
section independence for the case of Frees’ R2 and Pesaran’s CD tests for all estimated
models. There is also enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis of cross-section in-
dependence for the case of Friedman’s R for models II and III. Nonetheless, not enough
evidence exists to reject the null hypothesis of cross-section independence for the case of
Friedman’s R for model I. It is important to note that both Friedman’s R and Pesaran’s
CD tests are known to lack power when the error structure alternate in sign (see De Hoyos
and Sarafidis, 2006). This is the case as both tests compute the sum of the pair-wise coef-
ficients of the residual matrix that may cancel out when averaging. However, since Frees’
R2 compute the sum of the squared rank correlation coefficients it is not subject to this
drawback. For this reason, De Hoyos and Sarafidis (2006) have argued that if there is not
enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis of cross-section independence for Friedman’s
R and/or Pesaran’s CD (but not the case for Frees’ R2), but there is enough evidence
to believe that the correlation coefficient of the errors alternate in sign (for which the
average absolute value of the off-diagonal elements of the correlated residuals is large)1
then inference should be based on Frees’ R2. This result is exactly the case in model I
and suggest that there is enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis of cross-section
independence.
Table A.3: Tests for cross-section independence (equation A.1)
Test statistics I II II
Frees 8.170*** 8.807*** 8.861***
Friedman 38.056 48.982** 45.988**
Pesaran 2.214** 3.592*** 3.694***
ABS 0.467 0.496 0.497
Note: See Table A.2
1Not reported, the correlation coefficients of the errors are available upon request
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A.3 Panel Unit Roots and Cointegration Testing Pro-
cedures
A.3.1 Panel Unit Roots
The LLC test is based on the following regression
∆yit = δyi,t−1 +
pi∑
L=1
θiL∆yi,t−L + αmidmt + eit (A.5)
where m=1, 2, 3, and αmi and dmt are used to indicate the vector of deterministic variables
and the corresponding vector of coefficients for a particular model m=1, 2, 3 respectively.
LLC suggest three-step procedure that implements the test, since the lag order pi(which
is allowed to vary across individuals in the panel) is unknown. The three-steps involves
the estimation of a separate Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF ) regression for each N , the
estimation of the long run to short-run standard deviations and the estimation of the
panel test statistics.
On the other hand, Pesaran considers the following CADF regression
∆yit = αi + ρiyi,t−1 + d0y¯t−1 + d1∆y¯t + eit (A.6)
where y¯t is the average of yit at time t for the cross-section dimension of the panel. The
presence of cross-sectional averages of lagged levels (y¯t−1) and first differences ∆y¯t of
the individual series capture the cross-section dependence through a factor structure (see
Baltagi, 2008). In the presence of serial correlation in the error term, Pesaran suggest aug-
menting (A.6) with appropriate lags. Pesaran obtains the CADF (CIPSZt− bar) statis-
tic by averaging the t-statistics on the lagged value for each unit i (CADFi). CADF =
1
N
∑N
i=1CADFi. The asymptotic distribution of CADF (CIPSZt − bar) is non-standard
and asymptotic critical values are provided for different values of both N and T . The
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panel unit roots test results are presented in Tables A.42
Table A.4: Panel unit root test results
Variable Levels First-differences
LLC CADF LLC CADF
logY 3.753 -2.335 -13.053*** -3.891***
EG 1.629 -2.305 -7.737*** -2.721**
PS 1.326 -2.254 12.161*** -4.158***
PR 1.326 -2.114 -13.791*** -3.534***
PC 3.483 -2.267 -15.621*** -3.878***
EG ∗ PS 2.300 -1.583 -13.258*** -2.842***
EG ∗ PR 2.928 -2.239 -12.936*** -3.565***
EG ∗ PC 2.802 -2.339 -12.057*** -3.737***
logY ∗ 2.909 -2.166 -12.689*** -3.893***
logL 0.788 -2.284 -9.824*** -3.991***
K -0.616 -2.019 -11.828*** -2.998***
Note: We include a linear time trend in the deterministic
component in all tests since the series are trended. Issues
related to the choice of optimal lag length are settled with
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The critical values
for LLC and CADF are based on Levin and Lin (1992) and
Pesaran (2007) respectively. *** denote rejection of the null
hypothesis of unit root at the 1% level.
A.3.2 Panel Cointegration
The procedure involved in computing Pedroni’s seven test statistics first estimate and
stores the residuals from equation (2.1). The second step uses kernel estimator to com-
pute the long run variance (Lˆ211i) from the residuals (ηˆit) of the differenced regression of
the form ∆yit = σ1i∆x1it + ... + σMi∆xMit + ηit. This long run variance is required to
compute the panel statistics. In the third step, we use the estimated residuals (eˆit) from
equation (2.1) to compute the appropriate autoregressive models. For the non-parametric
statistics we estimate eˆit = ρˆieˆi,t−1 + ϕˆit and compute the long-run variance (σˆ2i ) and
2The LLC and CADF statistics have been implemented using the routine “XTUNITROOT” and
“PESCADF” in STATA respectively. Not reported, we also performed the Fisher-type panel unit root
test due to Choi (2001) using the routine “XTUNITROOT” in STATA that provides additional support
to our results
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the simple variance (sˆ2i ) from the residuals (ηˆi). Then the terms (λˆi) and (σ˜
2) can be
computed as λˆi =
1
2
(
σˆ2i − sˆ2i ) and σ˜2 ≡ 1N
∑N
i=1 Lˆ
−2
11iσˆ
2
i respectively. For the parametric
statistics we estimate eˆit = ρˆieˆi,t−1 +
∑Ki
k=1 ∆eˆi,t−1 + ϕˆ
∗
it and compute the simple variance
(sˆ∗2i ) from the residuals (ϕˆ
∗
it). In this expression K denotes the truncation lag permitted
to vary by individual countries. The term (s˜∗2i ) is computed as (s˜
∗2
i ) ≡ 1N
∑N
i=1 sˆ
∗2
i . The
seven panel statistics expressed in equations (A.7) to (A.13) are then computed with the
appropriate mean and variance adjustment terms as in Pedroni (1999).
Panel v-statistic:
Zv ≡ T 2N 32
(
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
Lˆ−211ieˆ
2
i,t−1
)−1
(A.7)
Panel ρ-statistic:
Zρ ≡ T
√
N
(
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
Lˆ−211ieˆ
2
i,t−1
)−1 N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
Lˆ−211i(eˆi,t−1∆eˆit − λˆi) (A.8)
Panel t-statistic (non-parametric):
Zpp ≡
(
σ˜2
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
Lˆ−211ieˆ
2
i,t−1
)− 1
2 N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
Lˆ−211i(eˆi,t−1∆eˆit − λˆi) (A.9)
Panel t-statistic (parametric):
Z∗t ≡
(
S˜∗2
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
Lˆ−211ieˆ
∗2
i,t−1
)− 1
2 N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
Lˆ−211ieˆ
∗
i,t−1∆eˆ
∗
it (A.10)
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Group ρ-statistic:
Z˜ρ ≡ TN− 12
N∑
i=1
(
T∑
t=1
eˆ2i,t−1
)−1 T∑
t=1
(eˆi,t−1∆eˆit − λˆi) (A.11)
Group t-statistic (non-parametric):
Z˜pp ≡ N− 12
N∑
i=1
(
σˆi
2
T∑
t=1
eˆ2i,t−1
)− 1
2 T∑
t=1
(eˆi,t−1∆eˆit − λˆi) (A.12)
Group t-statistic (parametric):
Z˜t ≡ N− 12
N∑
i=1
(
T∑
t=1
S˜∗2i eˆ
∗2
i,t−1
)− 1
2 T∑
t=1
(eˆ∗2i,t−1∆eˆ
∗
it) (A.13)
All statistics test the null hypothesis of no cointegration against the alternative hypothesis
of cointegration. The distinction rests on the treatment of ρi in the formulation of the
alternative hypothesis. The panel cointegration statistics test the null hypothesis that
ρi = 1 for all i, versus the alternative hypothesis that ρi = ρ < 1 for all i. While the
group mean panel cointegration statistics test the null hypothesis that ρi = 1 for all i,
versus the alternative hypothesis that ρi < 1 for all i. Thus, whilst under the alternative
hypothesis the former assumes a common value for ρi (i.e. ρi = ρ), the later does not.
The estimated results of Pedroni’s seven panel cointegration test statistics are reported
in Tables A.5 and A.63
3The tests include deterministic time trend and common time dummies and are implemented using
Pedroni’s procedure available in RATS. Not reported, we also considered the panel cointegration test due
to Kao (1999) that assumes slope homogeneity across the cross-sectional units of the panel. Kao’s test
result provides additional support to Pedroni’s test results
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Table A.5: Pedoni’s panel cointegration test results (equation 2.2)
Models I II III
Panel statistics
Panel v-statistic -0.977 -0.881 -0.919
Panel ρ-statistic -1.261 -1.505 -1.783*
Panel pp-statistic -9.487*** -10.162*** -10.913***
Panel adf -statistic -9.674*** -11.165*** -11.124***
Group mean statistics
Group ρ-statistic 3.011*** 2.499** 2.122**
Group pp-statistic -2.689*** -3.998*** -4.416***
Group adf -statistic -3.747*** -5.404*** -4.935***
Note: All test statistics are asymptotically normally distributed. However, for the
panel v-statistic only the right tail of the normal distribution is used to reject the
null hypothesis as it diverges to positive infinity under the null hypothesis of no
cointegration. ***(**)(*) denote rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration
at 1%(5%)(10%) level
Table A.6: Pedroni’s panel cointegration test results (equation A.1)
Models I II III
Panel statistics
Panel v-statistic -1.801 -1.631 -1.744
Panel ρ-statistic 1.934* 1.595 1.953*
Panel pp-statistic -7.646*** -9.529*** -8.356***
Panel adf -statistic -7.444*** -8.872*** -7.984***
Group mean statistics
Group ρ-statistic 4.601*** 4.641*** 4.617***
Group pp-statistic -4.154*** -4.093*** -4.010***
Group adf -statistic -3.480*** -3.124*** -4.224***
Note: See Table A.5
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A.4 Panel Group Mean FMOLS Estimator
The panel group mean FMOLS estimate equation (2.1) and xit = xi,t−1 + uit. The
innovation vector ωit = (eit, uit)
′ is I(0) with asymptotic long run covariance matrix
Ωi =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Ω11i Ω12i
Ω21i Ω22i
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
and autocovariances (Γi), and zit = (yit, xit) is I(1) and yit and xit are cointegrated. The
panel group mean FMOLS estimator for β gives:
βˆ = N−1
N∑
i=1
(
T∑
t=1
xit − x¯i)2
)−1( T∑
t=1
xit − x¯i)
)
y∗it − Tτi (A.14)
where y∗it = (yit − y¯i)- Lˆ21iLˆ22i∆xit, τˆi ≡ Γˆ21i + Ωˆ
o
21i-
Lˆ21i
Lˆ22i
(Γˆ22i − Ωo22i) and Lˆi is the a lower
triangular decomposition of Ωˆi. The associated t-statistic gives: tβˆ∗ = N
− 1
2
∑N
i=1 tβˆ
∗
i
where tβˆ
∗
i
= (βˆi
∗ − βo)
(
Ωˆ−111i
∑T
t=1(xit − x¯i)2
) 1
2
.
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Table A.7: Panel FMOLS estimates (equation A.1)
Variable I II III
logL 0.605*** 0.616*** 0.560***
[8.206] [8.051] [8.164]
K 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003***
[9.305] [7.971] [7.496]
EG -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0016*
[-0.665] [-0.384] [-1.883]
PS -0.131**
[-2.556]
PR -0.213***
[-3.649]
PC -0.242***
[-3.96]
EG ∗ PS 0.0031**
[2.108]
EG ∗ PR 0.0072***
[4.447]
EG ∗ PC 0.0095***
[5.356]
Note: Dependent variable logY ∗. ***(**)[*] denote
statistical significance at the 1% (5%)[10%] level.
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B.1 Averages of Country-specific Indicators
Table B.1 presents the list of WAMZ countries and their respective averages (1980-2008)
of government expenditure share in real GDP, real per capita GDP, trade openness ratio,
foreign aid share in real GDP and democracy index. As evident, the averages of these
indicators varies across countries. For instance, the richest economy in WAMZ (also
evident by its real per capita GDP)1, Nigeria has the smallest public sector as well as
the share of aid in real GDP. On the other hand, the public sector is biggest in Ghana,
followed by the Gambia. Liberia has the highest trade openness ratio and aid share in real
GDP while democracy index is highest in the Gambia with the poorest economy Guinea
having the lowest democracy index. Overall, the share of government expenditure in real
GDP of WAMZ countries average between 3-17%.
B.2 Test for Cross-section Dependence
In estimating equation (3.1) and (3.2) particular attention regarding the presence of cross-
section dependence, that results from unobserved common shocks, need to be taken into
account as this provides some indication of model misspecification (see Phillips and Sul,
1Based on World Bank (2011) - Classification of economies January 2011, Nigeria was classified as a
lower-middle income economy. The rest of WAMZ countries were classified as lower-income economies
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Table B.1: Country-specific indicators (Averages, 1980-2008)
Countries Government Income Openness Aid Democracy
The Gambia 0.16 447.705 0.43 0.10 0.54
Ghana 0.17 405.950 0.80 0.09 0.49
Guinea 0.09 281.538 0.71 0.08 0.29
Liberia 0.14 350.627 0.83 0.34 0.44
Nigeria 0.03 620.111 0.60 0.01 0.46
Sierra Leone 0.09 341.403 0.47 0.14 0.39
WAMZ 0.11 407.889 0.63 0.13 0.44
Note: Government = Government share in real GDP, Income = Real
per capita GDP, Openness = Trade openness ratio, Aid = Aid share
in real GDP, Democracy = Democracy index. Source: Polity IV
Project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009), World Bank (2010) -African
Development Indicators 2010 and United Nations (2011).
Table B.2: Test for cross-section dependence
Equation (1) (2)
Test statistic 89.274*** 60.766***
Note: *** denote statistical significance at the 1% level.
2003; De Hoyos and Sarafidis, 2006; Sarafidis and Robertson, 2006; Sarafidis and Wans-
beek, 2010). This is important because as Driscoll and Kraay (1998) note, the standard
errors associated with panel data models with cross-section dependence are inconsistent,
although the estimated parameters may be consistent (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998). For
this reason, we first determine if equation (3.1) and (3.2) are plagued by cross-section
dependence. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test statistic proposed by Breusch
and Pagan (1980) appropriate for T > N panels is employed. The test statistic follow a
chi-squared(q), where q is computed as N ∗ (N − 1)/2, under the null hypothesis of cross-
section independence. The test results reported in Table B.2 suggest that there is enough
evidence to reject the null hypothesis of cross-section independence for both equations.
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B.3 Panel Unit Root Tests
All panel unit root test results reported in Table B.3 include deterministic time trend
and are robust in the presence of cross-section dependence. The null hypothesis of both
Breitung and Pesaran tests is that the series have unit root against the alternative hy-
pothesis that the series are stationary. Hadri test reverses the null and the alternative
hypothesis where the null hypothesis assumes that all panels are stationary against the
alternative hypothesis that some panels have unit roots. This allows us to further confirm
the Breitung and Pesaran test that the series are indeed non-stationary.
Table B.3: Panel unit root test results
Variables Levels First Difference
Breitung Pesaran Hadri Breitung Pesaran
logGOV 2.001 -1.754 4.865*** -3.359*** -4.202***
logY -0.373 -2.019 5.147*** -2.141** -3.790***
logOPEN 1.598 -2.552 5.781*** -4.302*** -3.272***
logAID -0.277 -2.069 2.169** -3.251*** -4.185***
DEM -1.023 -1.213 5.436*** -5.709*** -3.200***
Note: ***, ** indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% level
B.4 Panel Cointegration Tests
Pedroni’s parametric panel t-statistic is appropriate as it corrects for bias introduced
by potentially endogenous regressors. Specifically, we compute the parametric panel t-
statistic as:
Panel t-statistic (parametric):
Z∗t ≡
(
S˜∗2
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
Lˆ−211ieˆ
∗2
i,t−1
)− 1
2 N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
Lˆ−211ieˆ
∗
i,t−1∆eˆ
∗
it (B.1)
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where (Lˆ11i) is the long run variance, (eˆit) is the residuals from equation (3.1) or (3.2). The
term (s˜∗2i ) is computed as (s˜
∗2
i ) ≡ 1N
∑N
i=1 sˆ
∗2
i , where sˆ
∗2
i is the simple variance computed
from the residual (ϕˆ∗it) of the expression eˆit = ρˆieˆi,t−1+
∑Ki
k=1 ∆eˆi,t−1+ϕˆ
∗
it, with K denoting
the truncation lag permitted to vary by individual countries
Larsson et al. (2001) uses the maximum likelihood procedure to implement a stan-
dardised LR-bar statistic to test the existence of common panel cointegrating rank for
panels. Specifically, the test compute:
ΥLR =
√
N
(
LR− E(Zk)
)
√
V ar(Zk)
(B.2)
where ΥLR is the standardised LR-bar, LR is the average of the individual cointegrating
rank trace test statistics for each country of the panel, E(Zk) and V ar(Zk) are the mean
and variance of the asymptotic trace statistic respectively. The asymptotic values of E(Zk)
and V ar(Zk) are based on Hlouskova and Wagner (2009a, 2009b). The null hypothesis is
that allN countries in the panel have a common cointegrating rank, against the alternative
that all N countries in the panel have a higher rank. The right tail of the standard normal
distribution is used to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. However, because
Johansen trace statistics often rejects the null hypothesis in small samples, we also report
results based on adjusted country-specific trace statistics using small-sample correction
factor suggested in Reinsel and Ahn (1992) and applied by Herzer (2010). The panel
cointegration tests result is summarised in Table B.4.
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Table B.4: Panel cointegration test results
Equation (1) (2)
Pedroni and Larsson et al. test statistics
Panel t 1.059 2.535**
Stand. LR-bar (A) 0.388 10.245***
Stand. LR-bar (B) -0.352 5.941***
Note: *** and ** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration at
1% and 5% level. Standardised LR-bar (B) are based on small-sample adjusted
trace statistics. The optimal lags are based on Schwarz information criterion
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C.1 List of Countries Considered in the Analysis
Table C.1: List of Countries Considered in the Analysis
Albania Dominica Republic Maldives Solomon Islands
Algeria Ecuador Marshall Islands South Africa*
Angola* Egypt Mauritania* Sri Lanka
Antigua & Bar. El Salvador Mauritius* St. Kitts & Nevis
Argentina Fiji Mexico St. Lucia
Belize Gabon* Microsenia, FS. St. Vinc. & Gre.
Bhutan Ghana* Mongolia Sudan*
Bolivia Grenada Morocco Suriname
Botswana* Guatemala Namibia* Swaziland*
Brazil Guyana Nicaragua Syria
Bulgaria Honduras Nigeria* Thailand
Cameroon* India Pakistan Tongo
Cape Verde* Indonesia Panama Tunesia
Chile Iran Papua New Gui. Turkey
China Iraq Paraguay Uruguay
Colombia Jamaica Peru Vanuatu
Congo, Rep.* Jordan Philippines Venezuela
Costa Rica Kiribati Romania Vietnam
Cote d’Ivoire* Laos Samoa Zambia*
Cuba Lebanon Sao Tome & Pri.*
Djibouti Lesotho* Senegal*
Dominica Malaysia Seychelles*
Note: Sub-Saharan African countries are marked with *
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C.2 Testing for Cross-section Dependence
Before we proceed to test for panel unit root in logYit and logOPENit, we first deter-
mine whether these series are plagued by cross-section dependence. This will allows us
to employ an appropriate panel unit root test, as traditional tests are not valid in the
presence of this type of dependence. The CD test we use is the one proposed by Pesaran
(2004), which is robust in the presence of structural breaks and appropriate for T < N
heterogeneous panels. The CD test, which tends to N(0, 1) under the null hypothesis
of no cross-section dependence as N tends to infinity, is based on the average of the
pair-wise correlations of the OLS residuals from the individual regressions in the panel
(i.e. CD=
√
2T/N(N − 1)∑N−1i=1 ∑Nj=i+1 ρˆij) (see Pesaran, 2004). The CD test statistics
(Table C.2) show strong evidence of cross-section dependence regardless of the pth-order
Augmented Dickey-Fuller ADF (p) used.
Table C.2: CD test statistics
Variable ADF (1) ADF (2) ADF (3) ADF (4)
Intercept only
logYit 22.62*** 21.69*** 20.32*** 18.48***
logOPENit 18.93*** 18.12*** 16.83*** 16.85***
Intercept and a linear trend
logYit 19.47*** 17.60*** 15.65*** 14.11***
logOPENit 18.27*** 17.90*** 17.09*** 17.24***
Note: Symbol *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% level. pth-order
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF (p)) test statistics are computed for each cross-section
unit separately with an intercept only, and with an intercept and a linear trend.
Following the procedure proposed by De Hoyos and Sarafidis (2006), we also test for the
null hypothesis of no cross-section dependence in the error term eit in Eq. (5.1). The
computed CD test statistic (i.e. 83.823) on the residuals in Eq. (5.1), clearly show the
presence of considerable cross-section dependence as the null hypothesis of no cross-section
dependence is strongly rejected (i.e. at the 1% level).
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Table C.3: IPS panel unit root test results
Variable ADF (1) ADF (2) ADF (3) ADF (4)
Intercept only
logYit -1.387 -1.347 -1.363 -1.339
logOPENit -1.428 -1.350 -1.297 -1.266
∆logYit -4.210*** -3.390*** -3.107*** -2.674***
∆logOPENit -4.597*** -3.623*** -3.149*** -2.830***
Intercept and a linear trend
logYit -2.241 -2.122 -2.120 -1.963
logOPENit -2.266 -2.238 -2.178 -2.147
Note: The critical values at the 1%(5%)[10%] level for IPS test statistics are -1.73(-
1.67)[-1.64] with an intercept case, and -2.36(-2.31)[-2.28] with an intercept and a linear
trend case. Symbol *** indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of non-stationary
variable at the 1% significance level
C.3 Testing for Panel Unit Roots
The presence of cross-section dependence implies that we are unable to rely on panel unit
root tests that do not control for this effect. For this reason, we make use of two panel
unit root tests adapted to the case of cross-section dependence: namely, the Im, Pesaran
and Shin (IPS) test and the cross-sectionally augmented IPS (CIPS) test, proposed by
Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) and Pesaran (2007) respectively. The IPS test does not
control for cross-section dependence, but we implement this test based on demeaned data
as suggested by Levin et al. (2002). Both test incorporates cross-sectional heterogeneity.
The panel unit root test statistics, reported in Tables C.3 and C.4, allow us to treat both
logYit and logOPENit as I(1) variables.
C.4 Testing for Panel Cointegration
Once it has been proved that all the variables are I(1), the next step is to determine
whether the series are cointegrated to avoid spurious regressions problems. In order to do
this we applied several tests (Table C.5), all of them suggesting that the series are indeed
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Table C.4: CIPS panel unit root test results
Variable ADF (1) ADF (2) ADF (3) ADF (4)
Intercept only
logYit -2.004 -1.881 -1.897 -1.787
logOPENit -2.053* -1.931 -2.031* -1.827
∆logYit -4.114*** -3.302*** -2.916*** -2.427***
∆logOPENit -4.331*** -3.279*** -2.960*** -2.572***
Intercept and a linear trend
logYit -2.473 -2.350 -2.322 -2.216
logOPENit -2.318 -2.204 -2.355 -2.091
Note: The critical values at the 1%(5%)[10%] level for CIPS test statistics are -2.17(-
2.08)[-2.02] with an intercept case, and -2.65(-2.56)[-2.51] with an intercept and a linear
trend case. Symbol ***(**)[*] indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of non-stationary
variable at the 1%(5%)[10%] significance level
cointegrated.
Table C.5: CIPS and IPS based panel cointegration test results
CIPS test statistics
CADF (1) CADF (2) CADF (3) CADF (4)
-2.238*** -2.126** -2.050* -2.029*
IPS test statistics
ADF (1) ADF (2) ADF (3) ADF (4)
-2.597*** -2.455*** -2.289*** -2.194
Note: CIPS and IPS test statistics are based on the residu-
als of MG and CCEMG respectively. The critical values at
the 1%(5%)[10%] level for the IPS and CIPS test statistics
are -1.73(-1.67)[-1.64] and -2.17(-2.08)[-2.02] respectively.
Symbol ***(**)[*] indicate rejection of the null hypothesis
of no cointegration at the 1%(5%)[10%] significance level
116
117 Appendix of Chapter 5
Table C.6: Pedroni’s cointegration test results
Raw data
Rho PP ADF
(i) 3.685*** 1.771* 12.311***
(ii) 4.234*** 1.969* 17.786***
Demeaned data
(i) 2.244*** -1.037 8.764***
(ii) 2.683*** -0.246 11.334***
Note: Rho, PP and ADF are the group mean
test statistics of Pedroni (1999, 2004), which
tends to N(0, 1) under the null hypothesis of
no cointegration. The test statistic labelled
(i) include fixed effects only (ii) includes both
fixed effects and heterogeneous trends. Symbol
***(**)[*] indicate rejection of the null hypoth-
esis of no cointegration at the 1%(5%)[10%] sig-
nificance level
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